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Abstract 
By 
Donal David Barnard Jr. 
Advisor: Professor Herbert D. Saltzstein  
In the United States criminal justice system, jurors are directed to determine a defendant’s guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt by establishing both the act of committing a crime (actus reus) and 
the culpable mental state of the defendant (mens rea), that is, the defendant’s intentionality. The 
role of a juror in a criminal case is that of a factfinder, deciding whether the two elements of the 
crime have been met. Criminal cases where jurors are asked to decide the facts vary in the harm 
that resulted. The more severe the harm, the greater the perceived injustice. This research 
examines if a motivation to reduce perceived injustice influences determinations of intentionality 
(mens rea), verdict decisions, and deserved punishment. Lastly, it examines if the court’s 
suggested remedy to mitigate the effects of biasing information—an instruction to disregard—is 
an effective solution. This study finds that there is a greater attribution of intentionality to a 
defendant’s actions when the harm resulting from an alleged crime is more severe. More severe 
harm also predicts greater belief in guilt, although this is mediated by intentionality. In addition 
to these findings, more severe harm and greater attribution of intentionality also predict harsher 
punishment. Whether the victim was an adult or child does not impact the attribution of 
intentionality, verdict decisions, or punishment. An instruction to disregard biasing information 
is ineffective. Results are discussed in the context of the just-world theory (Lerner & Miller, 
1978) and demonstrate a need in the criminal justice system for an empirically-driven re-
examination of the balance between prejudicial versus probative evidence.  
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 1 
Introduction 
 
American criminal jurisprudence comprises 52 separate criminal codes: one for each state 
and the District of Columbia, as well as the Federal Criminal Code, which governs federal 
jurisdictions. In most cases, the U.S. Constitution grants the power to assign criminal liability to 
the states. At the same time, the U.S. Constitution delegates the enforcement of both intrastate 
crimes and crimes specifically related to federal interests to the federal government (Robinson & 
Dubber, 2007).  
Most states and federal districts have, historically, applied two broad elements of a 
criminal offense: mens rea and actus reus. Thus, in most cases, a verdict of criminal guilt 
requires that the prosecution prove two things:  
1. That the defendant committed the offense of which he or she is accused (actus reus). 
2. That the defendant possessed the requisite state of mind to commit the crime (mens rea) 
(Chesney, 1932). 
The task of a juror as the trier-of-fact is to determine whether the requisite elements, 
actus reus and mens rea, have been met beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, jurors must 
evaluate the evidence to determine whether the prosecution has sufficiently proved that the 
defendant committed the criminal act(s) and that the defendant did so with the requisite culpable 
mental state. 
While there are identifiable complications with both determinations, the former can often 
be more straightforward than the latter. Jurors must decide whether there is sufficient evidence to 
prove that the defendant committed the accused act. There is a greater likelihood that direct 
physical evidence will indicate the actions of a defendant rather than the mental state, due to the 
fact that actions are concrete occurrences in the physical world and mental states must be 
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inferred from actions. Physical evidence linking a defendant to a crime scene (e.g., DNA 
evidence) is compelling and goes to substantiating actus reus.  
The evaluation of mens rea is more precarious both because it pertains to the state of 
mind of the defendant at the time of the crime (which can be distinct from the time at which the 
jury makes its decision) and because it is ill-defined in legal doctrine. Lacey (1993) observed, 
“Mens rea is the (not entirely happy) umbrella term used by most criminal law scholars to refer 
to a range of practical attitudes or states of mind on the defendant's part” (p. 621). Gardner 
(1993) echoed this difficulty, writing, “The mens rea concept is … notoriously elusive due to its 
history of imprecise and ambiguous exposition at the hands of common law courts, legislators, 
and commentators alike” (p. 635). Mens rea has been alternately described as “a guilty mind, a 
mind bent on evil, or a malicious intent” (Chesney, 1932, p. 628). 
A number of attempts have been made to clarify this ambiguity in practical application. 
In order to help jurors determine this element, two types of tests have regularly been provided. In 
objective tests, jurors are asked what a reasonable person would have been thinking in the 
defendant’s position. Subjective tests ask jurors to ascertain the mental state of the actual 
defendant. Recently, courts have moved more toward the subjective (Elliott & Quinn, 2008). 
First developed in 1962 (and updated in 1985) as a guide for states considering statutory 
reform, the American Law Institute's (1985) Model Penal Code attempted to establish more 
concrete definitions of culpability and provide some uniformity across jurisdictions. The drafters 
excised the words intent and intentions from its descriptions of mental states on the grounds that 
they were overly ambiguous and imprecise (Robinson & Dubber, 2007). Instead, they offered a 
minimum requirement of culpability that specifies, “A person is not guilty of an offense unless 
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he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to 
each material element of the offense” (American Law Institute, 1985, p. 21). 
While adopting many of the code’s reforms, some states have continued to include 
intentionality as a criterion of culpability. State governments, such as New York, Pennsylvania, 
Maine, and Texas, adopted language similar to the code’s but with the term intentionally 
substituted for purposely. Others have adopted their own terminology for the mental element of a 
crime, often using similar terms. For instance, when defining murder in the first degree, 
Washington State requires that the defendant acted with premeditated intent. Given its broad 
application as a pervasive mens rea criterion, it is important to understand how people attribute 
intentionality to an action.  
Determining Intentionality 
As early as Aristotle (1892), social scientists and philosophers have tried to define what it 
means for an individual to act intentionally, and to understand attributions of intentionality 
(Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Shaver, 1985). Recognizing the need for a clear, 
empirically supported model of intentionality ascription, Malle and Knobe (1997) set out to 
study the question and provide a rigorous definition of what characterizes an act that is viewed as 
intentional.  
First, they sought to understand how people think about the concept and the rationale for 
what acts can be viewed as intentional versus unintentional. They asked 104 San Jose State 
University students to evaluate a series of action statements and rate each on a spectrum of 
intentionality. They found little variation between subjects in their perceptions of intentionality 
and concluded that this can be explained by the existence of a shared tacit understanding of 
intentionality, which they termed the folk concept of intentionality. 
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In order to construct a model of the folk concept of intentionality, they first gave it a 
functional definition. They asked 159 college students to define their understanding of what it 
means for an act to be intentional. Students evaluated 20 verbal descriptions of a range of 
behaviors covering events, such as bodily actions, emotions, and accomplishments. They then 
identified which definitional attributes were pervasive throughout the responses.  
The model posits that for an action to be viewed as intentional, five key elements must be 
present: “A desire for an outcome; beliefs about an action that leads to that outcome; an intention 
to perform the action; skill to perform the action; and awareness of fulfilling the intention while 
performing the action” (Malle & Knobe, 1997, p. 101). Malle and Knobe then tested the model 
by providing written scenarios that controlled for each attribute—desire, belief, intention (which 
is a product of desire and belief), skill, and awareness—to demonstrate that, in general, all are 
necessary for an attribution of intentionality (Malle & Knobe, 1997). 
Knobe and Burra (2006) further articulated the distinction between having an intention 
and acting intentionally. The social perception of intention is partially determined by beliefs 
about an agent’s pre-behavioral psychological state (what they intend to do), whereas the 
determination of intentionality is based on a post-behavioral moral evaluation. Whether actions 
are judged as intentional is only a relevant determination if there is a question of wrongdoing. 
One may have an intention to kill one’s neighbor, which they may or may not act upon; until 
they actually kill their neighbor they could not be judged as doing so intentionally. 
In this dichotomy, the authors argued that when someone assesses whether another 
person has an intention, this person attempts to identify the presence or absence of a pre-
behavioral mental state. When assessing whether someone has acted intentionally, they engage in 
an evaluation of the behavior to assess wrongdoing; this suggests that the assessment of 
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intentionality, rather than a measure to anticipate behavior (based on someone’s intentions), 
should instead be understood primarily as a tool by which observers make judgments as to 
whether a behavior deserves blame and to what degree.  
Malle and Knobe’s (1997) experiments showed empirical support for Knobe and Burra’s 
(2006) theory. In the 1997 study, students were presented with written vignettes of a company 
executive whose actions increased company profits but also affected local wildlife. They were 
then asked to determine if he had the intention to affect the wildlife population and if he did so 
intentionally. The effects of his actions were varied. In one case, they increased the population, 
and in the other, they decreased the population.  
When informed that his actions would decrease the wildlife population, 87% of 
participants agreed that the executive had intentionally decreased the population. However, when 
asked if the executive intended to decrease the population, only 29% agreed. In the other 
scenario, when the executive’s actions increased the population, only 20% of the participants 
believed that he did so intentionally, and 0% said that he intended to increase the population. 
From this, Knobe and Burra (2006) concluded that not only do people distinguish between 
intention and intentionality; but they also more readily ascribe intentionality to bad actions than 
to good ones. In a related study, Malle and Nelson (2003) argued that the ascription of 
intentionality is shaded by the negative emotions felt towards the agent.  
Alicke (2008) evaluated Knobe and Burra’s (2006) findings in terms of outcome bias: 
“The tendency for people to blame actors for the outcomes of their actions, independent of their 
[the actors’] casual1 [sic] and intentional role in the event” (p. 179). Thus, although observers 
have acknowledged that an actor did not necessarily desire a specific outcome, they also 
                                                
1 From the context it can be inferred that Alicke intended to say “causal” and not “casual.”  
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attributed intentionality as a means of registering disapproval of what ultimately did occur. 
While some could argue that actors should be held responsible for the outcome of their actions, 
regardless of whether they acted with intentionality, this finding does raise the question of 
whether a causal link is more likely to be inferred when the outcome is more negative.  
Alicke (2000) argued that when people evaluate harmful events, they search for evidence 
of human control and its favorableness or unfavorableness. Evidential items are spontaneously 
evaluated along positive or negative dimensions (Osgood et al., 1957). People are predisposed to 
assign blame when a negative event occurs.  
Although Alicke (2000) used the term blameworthy, instead of intentional, he based his 
model on the assumption that the attribution of intentionality is synonymous with the ascription 
of blame. In his model of culpable control, Alicke sought to explain how people apply blame: 
When faced with events that evoke strong negative reactions, people search for someone to 
blame. They make a blame-validation assumption in which evidence is evaluated in a way that 
justifies that desire to blame. The model posited that events that have extremely negative 
outcomes evoke a negative response and thus initiate a blame-validation process. The assessment 
of intentionality becomes the assessment of blame. 
Tostain and Lebreuilly (2005) examined outcome bias specifically. This refers to the 
over-reliance on outcome information when determining the level of responsibility that should be 
attributed to an actor (Burger, 1981; Mazzocco, Alicke, & Davis, 2004). Tostain and Lebreuilly 
(2005) demonstrated that when evaluating an actor’s actions, individuals ascribed more or less 
blame, responsibility, and punishment, depending on the outcome of the actions. This occurred 
even when the actor could not have anticipated that particular outcome. When given the example 
of an individual whose speeding led to an automobile accident, participants were far more likely 
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to ascribe responsibility and blame to the driver’s actions when the crash resulted in fatalities 
compared to when it led to mild injuries. The exact same actions were attributed different levels 
of blame, depending on the severity of the outcome. From these findings, the researchers 
specified two modes of post-hoc evaluation that a person can engage in when attributing 
responsibility to an actor. When outcome severity was low, people would use the rational model 
to attribute responsibility to an actor. Conversely, when outcome severity was high, they would 
use the justification model.  
In the rational model, people use decision stages (Fincham & Jaspars, 1980; Shaver, 
1985; Weiner, 1995) to determine causality, intentionality to guide their judgments, and the 
appropriate punishment for an offense. In the first stage, people confirm the causal relationship 
between the offense and the outcome, analogous to the actus reus component of jury decision-
making. In the second stage, they evaluate the perpetrator's intentions to establish his or her 
responsibility for the outcome, analogous to the mens rea determination. Finally, they ascertain 
the appropriate punishment according to the degree of responsibility. Unforeseen or involuntary 
outcomes are not considered.  
Alternatively, the justification model, first proposed by Alicke (2000), incorporates the 
outcome bias. The model postulated that extreme outcomes provoke feelings of injustice in those 
tasked with determining responsibility and delivering punishment. To rectify these feelings, 
people seek a punishment commensurate with the level of injustice. They then attribute a degree 
of responsibility to the actor that would justify the punishment. In other words, they determine 
the punishment that they consider just and only then attribute a level of responsibility to the actor 
that will make such a punishment appropriate. Alicke’s finding may suggest that decision-
makers, instead of evaluating the evidence, consistent with the justification model, may 
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determine what punishment they believe would restore justice to the circumstances (i.e., a 
conviction), and then working backwards to justify holding a defendant accountable. If jurors in 
a criminal trial apply the justification model when the alleged crime involves extreme outcomes 
that provoke feelings of injustice, this would conflict with their prescribed role as factfinders. 
Instead of weighing the evidence to determine the outcome (verdict), they may instead be 
determining the outcome (verdict) that they feel is just and working backwards. 
A harm bias—or a post-hoc evaluation of events—relates to what Fischhoff coined the 
hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975). The hindsight bias refers to "the tendency for people 
considering a past event to overestimate their likelihood of having predicted its occurrence" (p. 
288). Fischhoff sought empirical support that outcome knowledge affected post-hoc assessments 
of the likelihood of an event's occurrence. In addition to finding that outcome knowledge 
influences the estimation of its likelihood, he found that those making the judgments were 
unaware that they were influenced by outcome knowledge. In other words, decision-making is 
subject to biases that influence judgments, and decision makers can be unaware that they are 
reasoning in the presence of such biases. 
In the justice system, jurors’ judgments are, to some degree, affected by outcome 
knowledge—the question for the jury is to evaluate past actions. LaBine and LaBine (1996) 
showed support that the hindsight bias affects jurors’ assessments of negligence. Mock jurors 
evaluated whether a therapist was negligent in fulfilling the Tarasoff Duty. The Tarasoff duty is 
the legal responsibility of a therapist to warn an individual if they believe that a patient they are 
treating has the intent to harm someone specific. A therapist can be held responsible if they had 
knowledge that their patient intended to harm a specific individual, but took no action to warn. 
LaBine and LaBine invited study participants to read case vignettes and then make 
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determinations of negligence in the duty to warn. Determinations of negligence and, therefore, 
whether the information the therapist had at the time warranted action, depended on their 
knowledge of the outcome. In the violent outcome condition, 24% of participants found the 
therapist negligent, while only 6% and 9% of jurors found the therapist negligent in the non-
violent and unspecified conditions, respectively. Knowledge of the outcome shaded the degree to 
which the participants both held the therapist accountable and their expectation of what the 
therapist knew and should have expected, given what they knew.  
Baron and Hershey (1988) sought to demonstrate that evaluation of decision quality was 
influenced by outcome information. In five experiments, University of Pennsylvania students 
used a Likert-type scale to evaluate the quality of a series of decisions (medical treatment and 
gambling) when both outcome and outcome knowledge were varied. In one example, students 
were told that a patient must make a difficult decision regarding treatment. The patient, a middle-
aged man, had chronic chest pain, which could be improved by an operation; however, the 
operation carried an 8% chance of death. Students were told of the man’s decision (to have or not 
have the operation) and the outcome (successful/unsuccessful/unstated) and were asked to 
evaluate the quality of the man’s decision.   
One experiment found:  
In 44.3% of the 140 pairs of cases that differed only in success or failure, higher ratings 
were given to the case with success; in 9.3%, higher ratings were given to the case with 
failure, and in 46.4%, equal ratings were given to the two cases. (Baron & Hershey, 1988, 
p. 569) 
The authors postulated that participants confused an evaluation of the outcome with an 
evaluation of the decision concluding that even when informed of the likelihood of a certain 
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outcome, regardless of the decision, people too heavily applied the rule that bad outcomes stem 
from bad decisions.  
In a related study, LeBoeuf and Norton (2012) sought to determine whether people 
attribute disproportionate importance to an event’s consequences when attributing its likely 
cause. They provided 129 students with the scenario of a computer crash and asked them to 
consider two possible causes and judge which cause was more likely. Information about the 
consequences of the crash was varied. In one case, an individual was fired for missing a deadline 
because of the crash; in the other, he received an extension on the deadline. In the more severe 
instance, 73% of participants judged a larger cause (a widespread virus) as more likely than a 
smaller cause (cooling fan malfunction). In the less severe case, only 56% judged the larger 
cause more likely. Based on this evidence, the researchers postulated their theory of 
consequence-cause matching, which stated that people have a tendency to match events’ 
consequences with causes that are similar in size and valence. The authors theorized that 
matching arose because people were motivated to see the world in a predictable way, using 
consequence-cause matching as a heuristic tool.  
While LeBoeuf and Norton (2012) addressed the fact that consequence-cause matching 
could occur along dimensions other than importance and valence, they did not address one 
dimension, which confounded the above finding. Based on their results, they concluded that 
individuals attributed larger, more negative causes to larger, more negative consequences; 
however, the data also showed support for an additional interpretation. A widespread computer 
virus is the result of a deliberate, malevolent human act, whereas a cooling fan malfunction is a 
technological occurrence devoid of intent. In the study, valence, outcome severity, and the 
human action were confounded. In this regard, LeBoeuf and Norton’s research might suggest 
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that people tend to attribute negative outcomes not only to negative causes but also to the 
deliberate acts of an individual. Consequence-cause matching is also consistent with the just-
world theory (Lerner & Miller, 1978) which also posits that people have a desire to believe the 
world is just and predictable, and will thus evaluate events in a manner that allows them to 
maintain that view.  
The just-world theory (Lerner & Miller, 1978) has been used to explain the varied 
responses that people have to what they view as an unjust situation. When an injustice is 
perceived, there is a motivation to reduce the level of injustice of the situation. Depending on the 
options available, there are a variety of ways one can reduce perceived injustice. For example, 
imagine a pedestrian is hit by a car and suffers physical injury. To reduce perceived injustice, a 
person, such as an outsider informed of the situation, may compensate the pedestrian for the 
harm suffered using monetary or other rewards in the aim of restitution if it is in their power to 
do so. Compensating a victim for harm that was suffered mitigates the perceived injustice of the 
situation. However, if a person is not in a position to take restitutive action, then they will engage 
in other tactics to reduce perceived injustice. Another option is to lower the appraisal of the 
victim or attribute partial blame to the victim for their circumstances. Lowering appraisal of a 
victim who suffered harm reduces the injustice of the situation when there are no other restitutive 
options available. The theory posits that people are motivated to believe that the world is just and 
orderly and, therefore, predictable. If the world were chaotic and unpredictable, it would hinder 
their ability to enter new situations. The view of the world as just allows people to enter 
uncertain situations, secure in the belief that doing so will not result in an unpredictable or 
negative outcome. As Lerner and Miller (1978) wrote, “The belief that the world is just enables 
the individual to confront his/her physical and social environment as though they were stable and 
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orderly” (p. 1030). An aspect of believing that the world is just and orderly includes believing 
that “people generally get what they deserve” (p. 1030). When presented with circumstances of a 
perceived unjust state of affairs, people can alter their perception of those circumstances—what 
they believe transpired—to resolve this dissonance, because bad things should not happen to 
good people. Reducing the injustice that is perceived reassures an individual that they will not 
become a victim; they will behave differently, thereby not putting themselves in a position to be 
victimized. 
The just-world theory has implications for the criminal justice system. As jurors, people 
are put in a position to decide the facts—what they believe transpired. The consequences of those 
decisions determine whether a person will be held accountable for harm to a victim. In 
accordance with the theory, an innocent victim who suffers harm as the result of crime is an 
injustice. As harm done to an innocent victim is viewed as unjust, then it is reasonable that the 
greater the harm, the greater the injustice, and the stronger the motivation to take restorative 
action. If people are willing to alter their view of what transpired to mitigate perceived injustice, 
does this lead to a greater motivation to hold a defendant accountable when greater harm 
occurred? In criminal cases, an option available to jurors is to hold a defendant accountable. 
Does this motivation to reduce injustice result in a greater likelihood of finding a defendant 
guilty when the crime they are accused of resulted in more severe harm? 
The above research supports the idea that when more negative event or more severe harm 
occurs, there can be greater attribution of intentionality (Alicke, 2000; Malle & Nelson, 2003), 
blame (Alicke, 2008), and responsibility (Tostain & Lebreuilly, 2005). As Alicke (2008) states 
that attribution of intentionality is a mechanism for registering disapproval for a negative 
outcome. Attributing events to intentional human action allows people to maintain the belief that 
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the world is predictable and orderly (LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; Lerner & Miller, 1978). In a 
criminal case, intentionality, with notable exceptions2, is often a primary element in determining 
a guilty verdict. Jurors are often expected to follow a line of reasoning similar to the rational 
model: to base their verdict on the determination of a causal link between the defendant’s actions 
and the crime (actus reus) and a finding that the actions were intentional (mens rea). However, 
when making judgments about events that resulted in severe harm, jurors may, in fact, apply a 
line of reasoning similar to the justification model: to seek to and restore a just state of affairs 
(Tostain & Lebreuilly, 2005). Based on these findings, we must question the assumptions that 
the courts make about jurors’ ability to set aside bias. When a defendant is accused of a crime 
that resulted in more severe harm, are they more likely to be convicted as the result of a 
motivation to attribute negative events to intentional human action and a motivation to believe 
the world is just and orderly? The present study examines whether attribution of intentionality 
and belief in a defendant’s guilt increases when greater harm has occurred, due to a motivation to 
reduce perceived injustice.  
Victim  
Research suggests that certain characteristics of the victim of an alleged crime, e.g., age, 
may influence perceptions of the severity of harm that has occurred. In murder cases, the race 
and gender of the victim have been shown to be indicators of whether capital punishment is 
pursued and meted out. In an early study, Paternoster (1984) found evidence of victim-based 
prosecutorial discretion, whereby the death penalty was pursued less often in cases with Black 
victims compared to those with White victims, unless the cases with the Black victim were 
                                                
2 Exceptions to these criteria exist in strict liability cases (i.e., those of statutory rape), in which an individual can be 
found guilty even if he committed the act unintentionally. 
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accompanied by aggravating circumstances. Bowers and Pierce (1980) found that there was 
greater likelihood in felony murder cases of the jury sentencing a defendant to death when the 
victim was White. Holcomb, Williams, and Demuth (2004) found that when all other legal 
factors were controlled for, defendants accused of killing White-female victims were more likely 
to receive the death penalty compared to any other gender-race combination.  
Baumer, Messner, and Felson (2000) found that when a defendant is accused of killing a 
stigmatized or disreputable person, their sentencing was more lenient. When the victim is 
identified as a person who committed wrongdoing in the past, it may be that this person is 
viewed as more deserving of their circumstances and the harm they endured is viewed as 
resulting from their own prior bad acts, if not actually karmically restitutive. When a victim is 
viewed as more deserving, or less innocent, there may be less of an inclination to attribute blame 
to a defendant. Crimes against child victims may be viewed as particularly heinous and 
deserving of punishment. For instance, Goodwin and Benforado (2014) found that when the 
victim of a shark attack was a little girl, as opposed to a homeless man or a dog, people were 
more likely to endorse that the shark should be killed.  
Attempts have been made to classify victims according to their relative degree of 
responsibility and power to control or affect the situation. Such categories also judge the degree 
of guilt or responsibility of victims, ranging from total innocence to total responsibility. As 
reviewed by Sengstock (1976), Mendelsohn argued that victims could be classified into six 
typologies: (a) completely innocent victims (typically children or those attacked while 
unconscious), (b) victims with minor guilt, (c) voluntary victims, (d) victims who are more guilty 
compared to the offender, (e) victims who are alone guilty, and (f) the imaginary victim. In this 
typology, children had the least amount of power to control the situation and were not considered 
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fully responsible on the same level as adults were. Although it is questionable whether a child 
would be considered “completely” innocent, it is reasonable that, all things being equal, a child 
would be viewed as more innocent than an adult. Adults, although capable of being as innocent 
as a child, are less likely to be perceived as such, given an adult’s greater ability to control their 
circumstances. It follows from this that harm done to children may be judged as more severe 
than harm done to adults.  
Although maintaining an alternative theoretical focus, these findings relating to victims are 
consistent with research on the just-world theory (Lerner & Miller, 1978). Victim research 
supports the notion that some victims, based on individual characteristics, e.g., age, sex, race, 
may be perceived as less deserving of harm. The just-world theory posits that a determination of 
a victim’s innocence depends on what perspective is required in order to maintain a view of the 
world as predictable. These theoretical perspectives are not mutually exclusive. Characteristics 
of a victim can be significant factors in juror judgments, as can situational factors. Both 
individual characteristics of the victim and circumstances of the crime may factor into 
determinations of a defendant’s culpability. A child victim is perceived as more innocent than an 
adult, but, where there is ambiguity, the child victim may be viewed as less innocent and more 
blameworthy to protect notions of a just world. This research investigates the possibility of a 
victim effect, whereby knowledge about the victim’s characteristics, whether an adult or child, 
may influence the degree to which a defendant is perceived as culpable.  
Judicial Instruction 
The influence of biasing information in legal proceedings has been a concern in the 
American justice system since its establishment. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution 
guarantees criminal defendants the right to an impartial jury (U.S. Const. amend. VI). From this, 
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we can surmise that the Founders understood that certain experiences and knowledge that jurors 
have, relevant to case-specific matters, can improperly influence their decisions as factfinders. 
Additionally, the Judiciary has conveyed understanding that certain information presented at trial 
can influence factfinders’ decisions. According to the Federal Rules of Evidence (§ 403, 2015), 
evidence can be excluded if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger 
of…unfair prejudice” (p. 37). Despite safeguards put in place to prevent the introduction of 
prejudicial evidence, it is common that in open court, information presented to jurors can later be 
deemed inadmissible due to a determination that it is prejudicial. The courts have typically 
offered two remedies when information deemed prejudicial is heard by jurors. The more costly 
and time-intensive option is for the trial-court judge to call a mistrial, dismissing the jury and 
empaneling a new one. The alternative option is that the judge may provide an instruction to 
jurors directing them to set aside what they heard and not allow the inadmissible evidence to 
influence their decisions in the case. While the trial-court judge has discretion on which option to 
utilize, the Supreme Court has endorsed that a directive from the judge can be an adequate 
remedy to remove bias, stating, “jury instructions suffice in excluding inadmissible evidence.” 
(Cruz v. New York, 1987, p. 191). In the eyes of the courts, verdicts reached by jurors exposed 
to prejudicial evidence carry no less weight than those reached by jurors not exposed. The 
question is whether the assumption that the courts make about jurors’ ability to set aside specific 
information when reaching decisions is supported by the empirical research. 
Research on how effective people are at regulating how specific knowledge influences 
their judgments suggests the courts may overestimate individuals’ abilities. Wegner (1994) found 
evidence for a paradoxical effect when people attempt to suppress mental states. The “ironic 
process theory” suggests that an attempt to suppress a mental state can result in the mental state 
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carrying greater impact. The author argued that the activity of suppressing a specific thought or 
mental state requires monitoring. Monitoring of the mental state can make it more pronounced, 
resulting in the opposite of the desired outcome.  
Research on how participants in court case simulations respond to directives to disregard 
inadmissible evidence has shown mixed findings. In an early study, Sue, Smith, and Caldwell 
(1973) examined whether participants, when reading a four-page synopsis of a murder case, were 
influenced by wiretapping evidence that was deemed inadmissible because it was obtained 
illegally. The researchers found that the strength of the evidence had an impact on whether the 
inadmissible evidence influenced participants’ decisions. When the evidence against the 
defendant was weak, participants were more likely to find the defendant guilty regardless of an 
instruction from the judge to disregard. However, when the case against the defendant was 
already strong, the wiretapping evidence did not affect verdicts. Wistrich, Guthrie, and 
Rachlinski (2005) found that even judges who instruct jurors to set aside inadmissible 
information were unable to do so. Judges’ decisions were affected by inadmissible information 
that they themselves determined to be inadmissible when they viewed the information as relevant 
to their decisions in the case.  
A meta-analysis that examined the impact of a judicial admonishment to disregard 
inadmissible evidence on verdicts suggested mixed results. Steblay, Hosch, Culhane, and 
McWethy (2006) incorporated 48 studies that examined if an admonition from the judge to 
disregard inadmissible evidence was effective at preventing the evidence from affecting verdict 
decisions. They found that an admonition from the judge did not fully eliminate the impact of the 
inadmissible evidence on jurors’ decisions. Further, when the admissibility of evidence was 
contested and then allowed, the impact of the evidence on verdicts increased. However, the 
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content of the inadmissible evidence was found to be a determinant of whether participants 
complied. Kassin and Sommers (1997), for example, reported that the content of inadmissible 
evidence and the judge’s explanation for its exclusion impacted the effect of inadmissible 
evidence on verdicts. Specifically, they examined the effect of a wiretap that was ruled 
inadmissible either because it was obtained illegally or because it was unreliable. Mock jurors 
were more likely to vote guilty when the evidence was excluded because it was obtained 
illegally, regardless of whether it was admissible or inadmissible, than in the condition where it 
was excluded because it was unreliable. Hence, we must question whether individuals can 
effectively disregard inadmissible evidence when the information they are presented is viewed as 
a relevant component of the case. Indeed, “reactancy theory” (Brehm, 1966) posits that jurors 
view such an admonishment from the judge as limiting their right to consider all available 
evidence and, therefore, give greater weight to evidence they are directed to disregard. Reactancy 
theory suggests that jurors’ disregard of judicial instruction is motivated by a desire to reach a 
just verdict, even if it means working outside of their prescribed role as factfinders.  
Pickle (1995) and Edwards and Bryan (1997) also found support for a “backfire” effect. 
Pickle had students listen to an audiotaped recording of a theft as part of the evidence when 
acting as mock jurors. Students were then instructed to disregard the evidence as inadmissible. 
Although Pickle did find that students were able to set aside inadmissible evidence when 
instructed to do so, when a legal explanation was provided along with the instructions, the 
inadmissible evidence did affect verdict decisions. Edwards and Bryan (1997) found that when 
the information was emotionally charged, participants were less compliant with a judicial 
instruction. The impact of the emotionally charged incriminating evidence was stronger with the 
addition of a judicial admonishment to ignore it. When jurors feel that the information they are 
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being told to disregard would assist them in determining what they believe actually happened, 
then the evidence will influence their decisions. For example, if jurors are told that they are to 
ignore evidence due to a legal technicality, then they are more likely to allow the information to 
affect their judgments.  
The harm that resulted from an alleged crime differs from inadmissible evidence, in that 
it is information that jurors are typically provided in court. However, the harm that occurred is 
not an element of the crime that jurors are asked to consider as factfinders. Further, information 
about the harm that occurred can be considered prejudicial, given the potential impact of the 
severity of harm on verdict decisions. If the severity of the harm that results from a crime carries 
a biasing effect, how effective is an instruction from the court to disregard? 
Importance of Current Study  
The above research illuminates a potential disparity between how the legal system 
expects individuals to make decisions and what the empirical research suggest they actually do. 
The harm that occurred as the result of an alleged crime may significantly influence jurors’ 
determinations of the facts and the likelihood that a defendant is believed to be culpable. A 
defendant accused of a more heinous crime, one that resulted in more severe harm, may have a 
greater likelihood of being found guilty.  
Individuals—including jurors—are motivated to mitigate perceived injustice (Lerner & 
Miller, 1978), in part, by attributing the cause of negative outcomes to intentional human action 
(LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012). When an injustice is perceived, individuals can be motivated to take 
action to restore a just state by altering perceptions of the situation, and possibly of the actors 
involved (i.e., victims and defendant) to mitigate the degree of the injustice.  
 20 
Although the criminal justice system has safeguards in place to protect against biasing 
information influencing the jury—a judicial admonition—these safeguards have demonstrated 
limited effectiveness (Steblay, Hosch, Culhane, & McWethy, 2006). In some instances, a judicial 
admonition has had the opposite of the desired effect (Brehm, 1966; Edwards & Bryan, 1997; 
Pickle, 1995). Further, people may often be unaware of what information influences their 
decisions, including verdict decisions in a trial context (Crocker & Kovera, 2010; Saltzstein, 
Sanvitale, & Supraner, 1978). Even when they are directed—and agree—to disregard specific 
information, that information can still contribute to one’s decision. This study seeks to examine 
if the behavioral assumptions underlying traditional adversarial safeguards to prevent bias are 
supported by the research. Do more heinous crimes result in a greater inclination to find an 
accused culpable? When the victim is a child versus adult, is there a greater inclination to find an 
accused culpable. If so, is this due to a greater attribution of intentionality when more severe 
harm has occurred?  
This study seeks to examine the following research questions and associated hypotheses: 
Research Question 1. What effects do harm severity and victim age have on attribution of 
intentionality to a defendant’s actions? 
H1: It was predicted that participants would attribute greater intentionality to the 
defendant’s actions when the alleged crime resulted in more severe harm.  
H2: It was predicted that participants would attribute greater intentionality to the 
defendant’s actions when the victim of the harm was a child as opposed to an adult.  
Research Question 2. What effects do harm severity, attribution of intentionality, and 
victim age have on verdict decisions?  
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H3: It was predicted that participants would have a greater belief in the defendant’s guilt, 
as measured by verdict confidence scores, when the alleged crime resulted in more severe 
harm. 
H4: It was predicted that participants would have a greater belief in the defendant’s guilt, 
as measured by verdict confidence scores, when there was greater attribution of 
intentionality to the defendant’s actions. 
H5: It was predicted that participants would have a greater belief in the defendant’s guilt, 
as measured by verdict confidence scores, when the victim of the harm was a child as 
opposed to an adult. 
Research Question 3. What effects do severity of harm, attribution of intentionality, and 
victim age have on perceptions of deserved punishment? 
H6: It was predicted that greater punishment, as indicated by longer sentence length, 
would be recommended for the defendant when the alleged crime resulted in more severe 
harm. 
H7: It was predicted that greater punishment, as indicated by longer sentence length, 
would be recommended for the defendant when there is greater attribution of 
intentionality to the defendant’s actions. 
H8: It was predicted that greater punishment, as indicated by longer sentence length, 
would be recommended for the defendant when the victim of the harm was a child as 
opposed to an adult. 
Research Question 4. What is the effect of instructing participants not to allow level of 
harm or sympathy for the victim to influence their judgments on the relationships identified in 
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previous research questions?  
H9: It was predicted that when participants are instructed to not allow the level of harm 
that occurred or sympathy for the victim to influence their judgments, that these 
instructions would not mitigate the effects of harm or victim on verdict confidence or 
recommended sentence length. Effectively, it was predicted that there would be no effect 
of instruction on the above hypotheses, if significant. 
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Method 
Participants 
For this study, 340 participants were sourced from an online research pool and were 
randomly assigned to one of eight conditions. Participants were recruited via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online subject pool where individuals participate in surveys and 
other activities in return for monetary compensation. While MTurk has been found to be as 
representative of the general population and more diverse than traditional undergraduate-college 
sampling (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; for reviews, see Mason & Suri, 2012 and 
Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010), some findings suggest that respondents can be less 
attentive than in other forms of data collection. Goodman, Cryder, and Cheema (2013) found that 
MTurk participants perform more poorly on instructional manipulation checks (IMCs) than do 
traditional undergraduate college samples. In-person data collection procedures can offer greater 
assurance that participants appear to be attending to the study materials. By contrast, MTurk 
respondents are participating remotely—likely from home, work, or where they have access to 
the internet—therefore, focused attention is less guaranteed. However, Goodman, Cryder, and 
Cheema (2013) showed that by filtering out MTurk participants who failed the IMCs, statistical 
noise was reduced and there was an increased likelihood of observing statistically significant 
differences on other dimensions. For this reason, the present study included IMCs and did not 
include participants in the analysis who failed the IMCs. Additionally, only participants who 
self-reported that they believed themselves to be eligible for jury service in the United States 
were included in the analysis. Two participants indicated that they were not eligible for jury 
service and, therefore, their data were excluded from the analysis. These two participants were 
also omitted because they failed the instruction instructional manipulation checks.  
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Overall, 81 participants failed one or more IMCs, leaving a sample of 259 participants. 
See Appendix A for descriptive data of participants excluded from the analysis. A power 
analysis based on an estimated medium effect size of 0.4 determined that a sample of 259 
participants was adequate to detect any moderate to large effects at a significance level of .05 
and a power of 0.80 for an analysis of variance and multiple linear regression analysis.  
Of the participants included in the analysis, 121 (46.7%) were female and 138 (53.3%) 
were male. The mean age was 33.9 years (SD = 10.19 years). In terms of race, participant 
responses were based on an open-ended question. Respondents wrote down the racial description 
that best fit their own characteristics. Responses were later grouped into five categories – 
White/Caucasian, Black/African American, Hispanic/Latino, Asian, and Mixed. Most 
participants identified as White/Caucasian (76.4%), followed by Asian (7.7%), Hispanic/Latino 
(6.6%), Black/African American (5.8%) and Mixed (3.5%). Most participants (86.9%) responded 
that they had not previously participated in jury service.  
Design 
The overall design was a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design (harm: severe or mild; victim: child 
or adult; and instruction: present or absent). In all conditions, participants read an abbreviated 
vignette of a criminal arson case (see Appendix B). They were then asked to complete a 
questionnaire (see Appendix C), which included asking participants to render a verdict as if they 
were a juror hearing this case, provide their confidence in that verdict, rate the degree to which 
the defendant’s actions were intentional, and indicate the length of sentence they believed was 
warranted if the defendant were found guilty.  
After providing informed consent (see Appendix D), one of eight versions of the 
abbreviated vignettes was read by each participant. Each vignette varied the severity of harm 
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(mild or severe), the age of the victim (child or adult) who suffered the harm, and whether 
participants were provided an instruction (present or absent) not to allow the harm or victim to 
influence their verdict decisions. All vignettes described an arson case involving an accused 
defendant throwing a lit cigarette into a trashcan in the apartment complex where he resided. 
This action caused a fire in a remote location. The accused defendant was known to have been in 
the midst of a dispute with the property manager of the apartment complex leading up to this act. 
The vignette involved an arson case because the circumstances allowed for the act to be 
separated from the potentially culpable mental state. By controlling for the act, we are able to 
determine variation in the assessment of mens rea. The severity of the harm that resulted from 
the accused’s actions (i.e., duration of required hospitalization for the victim), the age of the 
victim who was harmed in the fire (i.e., a child or an adult), and whether or not an instruction 
was provided (not to allow the harm that occurred or sympathy for the victim to affect verdicts) 
were varied across conditions.    
Harm Manipulation 
The variable “harm” was operationalized by the duration of the hospital visit required by 
the bystander (victim), as well as whether the continued use of oxygen was required. In the 
vignette, the bystander was located in a building that adjoined the apartment complex property, 
where the fire had spread. In the mild-harm condition, the fire resulted in the victim requiring a 
3-hour hospitalization due to smoke inhalation. In the severe-harm condition, the victim required 
a 3-week hospitalization and would require indefinite oxygen administration. Pilot data were 
collected to ensure that there was adequate variability to observe any effects for each of the 
dependent measures. Sixty participants were included in the pilot procedure. Although pilot data 
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indicated more not guilty than guilty verdicts, verdict confidence scores demonstrated adequate 
variability to detect potentially significant findings. See Appendix E for descriptive pilot data.  
To confirm that the manipulation of harm conditions represented a difference in severity, 
an IMC for harm was administered. Near the end of the procedure, participants were asked to 
rate the severity of the harm that occurred on a Likert-type scale from 1 (not at all severe) to 7 
(extremely severe). For the severe-harm condition, participants rated harm-severity significantly 
higher than participants in the mild-harm condition. The mean rating for participants in severe-
harm condition was 5.26 (SD = 1.204) and the mean rating for participants in the mild-harm 
condition was 3.55 (SD = 1.511). An independent sample t-test was conducted, and harm-
severity ratings were significantly higher for the severe harm condition than for the mild harm 
condition, t = -10.009, p < .001 (see Table 1). 
 
 
Victim Manipulation  
The variable “victim” was operationalized by whether the bystander who suffered harm 
as a result of the fire was specified as a child or whether it was just stated that it was a person. In 
the child-victim condition, the vignette read, “the result of Mr. Parker’s actions was that the fire 
spread to a building next door where a child was harmed.” The adult-victim condition read, “the 
Table 1 
Harm Severity Ratings by Harm 
Harm Conditions t df p 95% CI 
Severe vs. Mild* -10.009 228.711 <.001 -2.053, -1.378 
Note. Harm (independent variable): mild and severe. Harm severity rating (dependent 
measure): Scale: 1 (not at all severe) to 7 (extremely severe). (N=259). *p < .001. 
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result of Mr. Parker’s actions was that the fire spread to a building next door where a person was 
harmed.” It was not specifically stated that the person harmed was an adult. To specify that it 
was an adult would have been unconventional phrasing and would have drawn undue attention to 
the manipulation. This could have jeopardized the mundane realism of the vignettes. For this 
reason, it was decided to state that the victim was a person, as it would likely be assumed that 
victim was an adult. 
To confirm that participants appreciated the difference in victim conditions, an IMC for 
victim was administered near the end of the procedure. Participants were asked whether the 
victim in the fire was a child or whether it was not specified. Only participants who provided a 
correct response to the victim IMC, based on their randomly assigned condition, were included 
in the analysis. From the original sample of 340, 11 participants were excluded from the analysis 
because they did not pass the victim IMC. From the child-victim group, 7 participants (4.1%) 
failed the IMC and from the adult-victim group, 4 participants (2.4%) failed the IMC.  
Instruction Manipulation 
The variable “instruction” was operationalized by whether or not participants read an 
instruction not to allow the harm or the victim to influence their decisions in the case. In the 
instruction-present condition, the following statement was read by participants: 
IMPORTANT: You must not allow any feelings or judgments about the harm that has 
been caused or sympathy that you may have for the victim to influence your decision 
about the facts of the case. You must decide the case solely on the evidence and the law 
before you. Again, it is very important that you not allow your personal feelings about the 
harm that occurred to influence your verdict decision. 
 
In the instruction-absent condition, the above statement was not provided.  
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To confirm that participants were aware of the study manipulation for instruction, an 
IMC was administered near the end of the procedure. Participants were asked whether the 
following statement was true or false: 
The initial instructions read at the beginning (the instructions that were provided by the 
judge) specifically stated that you are not to consider your reaction to the harm that 
occurred or the identity of the victim when making your determination about whether the 
defendant is guilty of arson.    
 
From the sample of 340, 78 participants were excluded from the analysis because they 
failed the instruction IMC. There was an overlap of 8 participants who failed both the victim 
IMC and the instruction IMC. Of those who failed the instruction IMC, 14 participants (17.9%) 
indicated they did not receive an instruction, when in fact they did, while 64 participants (82.1%) 
indicated that they did receive an instruction, when in fact they did not. As addressed in the 
results and discussion, the instruction IMC was a stricter measure than the victim IMC. 
However, there is no indication that either the victim or instruction IMCs were ineffective in 
screening participants who may not have attended to the experimental manipulations, nor were 
there systemic differences observed for those who were omitted. The excluded sample of 81 
participants did not significantly differ demographically from the sample included in the 
analysis. This sample was composed of slightly fewer females (45.7%) than males (54.3%). The 
mean age in the excluded sample was 33.2 (SD = 11.10). Most respondents identified as 
White/Caucasian (72.8%), followed by Black/African American (13.6%), Hispanic (7.4%), 
Asian (4.9%) and Mixed (1.2%). There were no statistically significant differences between the 
participants that were included and those that were excluded in terms of gender, χ2(1) = 0.027, p 
= 0.899, ethnicity χ2(4) = 6.796, p = 0.147, or age, t(338)= -0.502, p = 0.616.  
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Intentionality Dependent Measure 
As a measure of the degree to which participants attributed intentionality to the 
defendant’s actions, participants were asked to rate their level of agreement or disagreement with 
the following statement, “The defendant intentionally started the fire.” Participants indicated 
their level of agreement, 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), that the defendant 
intentionally started the fire. Higher ratings indicated greater agreement that the defendant 
intentionally started the fire.  
Verdict Confidence Dependent Measure 
As a dependent measure of verdict decisions, verdict confidence scores were calculated 
using a composite of each participant’s guilty or not guilty verdict and their reported confidence 
in that decision. Dichotomous verdicts were recoded with confidence ratings (ranging from 0% 
to 100%) to produce a composite measure of verdict confidence score ranging from 1 to 22: 1, 
representing 100% confidence in not guilty; 11, representing 0% confidence in not guilty; 12, 
representing 0% confidence in guilty; and 22, representing 100% confidence in guilty. As other 
researchers have done to assess verdict decisions (Carlson & Russo, 2001; Crocker & Kovera, 
2009; Edwards & Bryan, 1997; Sommers & Kassin, 2001), taking into account participants’ 
confidence in their guilty/not guilty verdict is a more sensitive measure to ascertain the strength 
of their decision. A composite measure allows differentiation between participants’ strength in 
their position. For example, two participants may have returned the same dichotomous verdict, 
but one was entrenched in their position, while the other was on the fence. A composite measure 
captures this difference. In the present study, while the bimodal distribution of dichotomous 
verdicts skewed toward not guilty, the data for verdict confidence more approximated normality. 
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Deserved Punishment Dependent Measure 
Recommended sentence was a dependent measure of the level of punishment that the 
defendant deserved. As the final item in the procedure, participants were asked, “assuming the 
defendant was found guilty, what is your sentencing recommendation?” In criminal proceedings, 
judges, not jurors, make sentence recommendations. In this procedure, sentence recommendation 
served as a metric of the level of punishment participants believed the defendant deserved. 
Participants indicated recommended sentence using a slider scale ranging from 0 to 25 years. 
There were eight tick marks evenly dispersed across 0 and 25 years on the slider. The first tick 
mark to the left represented 0 years and last tick mark to the right represented 25 years. The tick 
mark selected by participants was converted to a 0 to 25-year scale, which was subsequently 
analyzed.  
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Results 
 
The first goal of the study was to investigate whether greater intentionality is attributed to 
a defendant’s actions when the harm resulting from an alleged crime was more severe and when 
the victim of the harm was a child as opposed to an adult. Demographic variables did not 
correlate with intentionality. Neither participant gender, r(257) = -.05, p = .422, nor participant 
age, r(257) = .085, p = .171, correlated with intentionality ratings. Hypothesis 1 predicted that 
participants would attribute greater intentionality to the defendant’s actions when the alleged 
crime resulted in more severe harm. Hypothesis 2 predicted that participants would attribute 
greater intentionality to the defendant’s actions when the victim of the harm was a child as 
opposed to an adult.  
A two-way analysis of variance yielded a main effect for the attribution of intentionality, 
F(1, 255) = 5.45, p = .020 (see Table 2), such that the average intentionality rating was 
significantly higher for participants in the severe harm condition (M = 2.71, SD = 1.43) than in 
the mild harm condition (M = 2.30, SD = 1.46) (see Table 3). Based on the results provided, 
hypothesis 1, which stated that greater attribution of intentionality results from greater harm, was 
supported. 
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Table 2      
Factorial ANOVA Results (DV = Intentionality)  
Source Type III SS df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 19.293a 3 6.431 3.109 .027 
Intercept 1611.474 1 1611.474 779.185 .000 
Harm 11.277 1 11.277 5.453 .020 
Victim 5.992 1 5.992 2.897 .090 
Harm * Victim 2.830 1 2.830 1.368 .243 
Error 527.379 255 2.068  
Total 2188.000 259   
Corrected Total 546.672 258   
Note. R2 = .035 (Adjusted R2 = .024). 
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Table 3    
Mean Intentionality Ratings by Condition   
Harm Victim Instructions Mean SD N 
Mild Child Yes 2.08 1.22 36 
No 1.96 0.93 23 
Total 2.03 1.03 59 
Adult Yes 2.43 1.77 35 
No 2.70 1.75 27 
Total 2.55 1.75 62 
Total Yes 2.25 1.471 71 
  No 2.36 1.467 50 
  Total 2.30 1.46 121 
Severe Child Yes 2.89 1.62 36 
No 2.41 1.24 32 
Total 2.66 1.46 68 
Adult Yes 2.86 1.59 36 
No 2.65 1.18 34 
Total 2.76 1.40 70 
Total Yes 2.88 1.592 72 
 No 2.53 1.205 66 
 Total 2.71 1.43 138 
Total Child Yes 2.49 1.43 72 
No 2.22 1.34 55 
Total 2.37 1.31 127 
Adult Yes 2.65 1.68 71 
No 2.67 1.45 61 
Total 2.66 1.57 132 
Total Yes 2.57 1.559 143 
 No 2.46 1.321 116 
 Total 2.52 1.46 259 
Note. Agreement that Defendant intentionally started fire. Scale 1(strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). 
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The main effect for victim on intentionality rating was nonsignificant, F (1, 255) = 2.897, 
p = .090. Although this finding approaches significance, the trend was in the opposite direction 
of what was hypothesized; non-significant findings show higher intentionality ratings in the adult 
condition (M = 2.66, SD =1.57) than the child condition (M = 2.37, SD =1.31). Hypothesis 2, 
which anticipated greater attribution of intentionality results when the victim was a child as 
opposed to an adult, was not supported. 
This study also investigated whether participants had a greater belief in the defendant’s 
guilt when the harm resulting from a crime was more severe, when there was greater attribution 
of intentionality to the defendant’s actions, and when the victim of the harm was a child as 
opposed to an adult. Demographic variables did not correlate with verdict confidence scores. 
Neither participant gender, r(257) = -.051, p = .413, nor participant age, r(257) = .021, p = .737, 
correlated with verdict confidence scores. For hypothesis 3, it was predicted that participants 
would have a greater belief in the defendant’s guilt, as indicated by higher verdict confidence 
scores, when the alleged crime resulted in more severe harm. For hypothesis 4, it was predicted 
that participants would have a greater belief in the defendant’s guilt when there was greater 
attribution of intentionality to the defendant’s actions. For hypothesis 5, it was predicted that 
participants would have a greater belief in the defendant’s guilt when the victim of the harm was 
a child as opposed to an adult. 
To answer hypotheses 3, 4, and 5, a multiple linear regression was utilized with severity 
of harm, victim, and intentionality ratings as independent variables, which were entered 
simultaneously into the equation. Multiple linear regression was used in order to include 
intentionality ratings as a contributing factor in the model. Collinearity diagnostics showed that 
the independent variables were not correlated with each other, and there were, therefore, no 
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concerns of multicollinearity. The results of the regression analysis indicated the model 
accounted for 56.8% of the variance, F(3, 255) = 111.77, p < .001 (see Table 4). Intentionality 
ratings significantly predicted verdict confidence scores, β = .749, p < .001, such that an increase 
in intentionality ratings predicted an increase in verdict confidence scores. Table 5 displays 
verdict confidence scores across conditions. Harm did not significantly predict verdict  
confidence scores, β = .04, p = .332, and neither did victim, β = -.034, p = .414. 
Note. R2 = .568 (Adjusted R2 = .563). *p < .001. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Multiple Regression Analysis for Verdict Confidence Scores 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -1.765 .930  -1.898 .059   
Harm .403 .414 .040 .972 .332 .980 1.021 
Victim -.337 .411 -.034 -.819 .414 .990 1.010 
Intentionality* 2.563 .143 .749 17.93 .000 .970 1.031 
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Dichotomous verdicts (guilty/not guilty) were also analyzed as a measure of verdict 
decisions. A binary logistic regression of dichotomous verdicts yielded similar results to the 
findings for verdict confidence, with one exception. In the above analysis, harm did not 
significantly influence verdict confidence scores when intentionality was also entered into the 
regression model, but harm did significantly predict dichotomous verdicts. The results of the 
Table 5    
Mean Verdict Confidence Scores by Condition    
Harm Victim Instructions Mean SD N 
Mild Child Yes 3.83 3.47 36 
No 3.13 1.79 23 
Total 3.56 2.93 59 
Adult Yes 4.09 4.33 35 
No 4.93 6.13 27 
Total 4.45 5.16 62 
Total Yes 3.96 3.89 71 
 No 4.10 4.71 50 
 Total 4.01 4.23 121 
Severe Child Yes 5.89 5.84 36 
No 5.03 5.34 32 
Total 5.49 5.59 68 
Adult Yes 6.06 6.11 36 
No 4.85 4.55 34 
Total 5.47 5.4 70 
Total Yes 5.97 5.934 72 
 No 4.94 4.91 66 
 Total 5.48 5.47 138 
Total Child Yes 4.86 4.88 72 
No 4.24 4.31 55 
Total 4.59 4.63 127 
Adult Yes 5.08 5.36 71 
No 4.88 5.26 61 
Total 4.99 5.3 132 
Total Yes 4.97 5.11 143 
 No 4.58 4.83 116 
 Total 4.80 4.98 259 
Note. Verdict confidence scores (Scale: 1 to 22) are a composite measure of dichotomous 
verdict and confidence in verdict. Higher scores indicate greater confidence in guilt. 
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binary logistic regression (see Table G1) yielded that harm significantly influenced dichotomous 
verdict, Wald = 3.914, p = .048, such that participants in the severe harm condition were more 
likely to indicate that the defendant was guilty than participants in the mild harm condition. See 
Appendix G for an analysis of dichotomous verdict results. 
The observed relationships between harm and intentionality, and between intentionality 
and verdict confidence suggested the possibility of mediation. Harm significantly affected the 
attribution of intentionality and attribution of intentionality significantly affected verdict 
confidence scores, but harm had no significant effect on verdict confidence when both victim 
and intentionality were entered simultaneously into the regression model. It was, therefore, 
examined if intentionality mediated the relationship between harm and verdict confidence. There 
are four steps in testing the mediation model (Baron & Kenny, 1986). First, the direct effect of 
harm on verdict confidence was tested, and the results showed that harm was a significant 
predictor of verdict confidence scores, β = .147, p = .018 (see Table 6).  
 
Table 6 
Direct effect of X (Harm) à Y (Verdict Confidence) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2.555 .990  2.580 .010 
Harm* 1.462 .614 .147 2.379 .018 
Note. Dependent Variable: Verdict Confidence. *p < .05. 
  
Second, the effect of harm on intentionality was tested. The results yielded that harm was 
a significant predictor of intentionality, β = .142, p = .023 (see Table 7).  
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Table 7 
Direct effect of X (Harm) à M (Intentionality) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.885 .290  6.503 .000 
Harm* .413 .180 .142 2.295 .023 
Note. Dependent Variable: Intentionality. *p < .05. 
 
Third, the effect of intentionality on verdict confidence was tested. The results yielded 
that intentionality was a significant predictor of verdict confidence, β = .752, p < .001 (see Table 
8).  
 
Table 8 
Direct effect of M (Intentionality) à Y (Verdict Confidence) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -1.676 .409  -4.101 .000 
Intentionality* 2.571 .141 .752 18.280 .000 
Note. Dependent Variable: Verdict Confidence. *p < .001. 
 
The final model (see Table 9) tested the effect of harm and intentionality on verdict 
confidence. When intentionality is accounted for in the model, β = .746, p < .001, harm is not a 
significant predictor of verdict confidence scores, β = .041 p = .324. This mediation model 
suggests that there is a full mediation of intentionality for the relationship between harm and 
verdict confidence (see Figure 1). 
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Table 9 
Indirect/mediation effect of X (Harm) |M (Intentionality) à Y (Verdict Confidence) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -2.253 .712  -3.163 .002 
Harm .409 .414 .041 .989 .324 
Intentionality* 2.551 .142 .746 17.954 .000 
Note. Dependent Variable: Verdict Confidence. *p < .001. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  
Indirect effect of harm on verdict confidence, mediated by intentionality. 
  
A goal of the present study was to investigate whether participants believed that a 
defendant was more deserving of punishment when the harm resulting from a crime was more 
severe, when there was greater attribution of intentionality, and when the victim of the harm was 
a child as opposed to an adult. Demographic variables did not correlate with recommended 
sentence length. Neither participant gender, r(257) = -.089, p = .153, nor participant age, r(257) 
= -.029, p = .647, correlated with recommended sentence length. Table 9 shows recommended 
sentence length across conditions. For hypothesis 6, it was predicted that greater punishment 
would be recommended for the defendant when the alleged crime resulted in more severe harm. 
For hypothesis 7, it was predicted that greater punishment would be recommended for the 
Harm 
Verdict 
Confidence 
Intentionality 
.14 .746 
Indirect: .04 
Direct: .15 
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defendant when there is greater attribution of intentionality to the defendant’s actions. For 
hypothesis 8, it was predicted that greater punishment would be recommended for the defendant 
when the victim of the harm was a child as opposed to an adult. A multiple linear regression was 
conducted using the three independent variables entered simultaneously. The results of the 
regression analysis indicated the model accounted for 19.4% of the variance, F(3, 255) = 20.487, 
p < .001. Intentionality ratings significantly predicted recommended sentence length, β = .396, p 
< .001 (see Table 10), such that an increase in intentionality ratings predicted an increase in 
recommended sentence length. Table 11 displays recommended sentence across conditions. 
Harm predicted recommended sentence length, β = .148, p = .01, such that severe harm predicted 
an increase in recommended sentence length. Victim did not significantly predict recommended 
sentence length, β = -.90, p = .343. 
 
Note. R2 = .194 (Adjusted R2 = .185). *p < .05. **p < .001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 
Multiple Regression Analysis for Recommended Sentence Length 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -1.349 1.711  -.788 .431   
Harm* 1.991 .762 .148 2.611 .010 .980 1.021 
Victim -.719 .757 -.054 -.950 .343 .990 1.010 
Intentionality** 1.825 .263 .396 6.938 .000 .970 1.031 
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Note. Longer recommended sentences represent greater deserved punishment (Scale: 0 to 25 
years). 
 
Finally, the present study examined whether an instruction to participants mitigated the 
significant effects of harm and intentionality on verdict confidence scores or recommended 
sentence length. For hypothesis 9, it was predicted that when participants were instructed to not 
allow the level of harm that occurred or sympathy for the victim to influence their judgments, 
that these instructions would not mitigate significant effects on verdict confidence or 
Table 11    
Mean Recommended Sentence Length by Condition   
Harm Victim Instructions Mean SD N 
Mild Child Yes 4.17 5.3 36 
No 3.88 4.56 23 
Total 4.06 4.98 59 
Adult Yes 3.27 6.21 35 
No 3.70 7.38 27 
Total 3.46 6.69 62 
Total Yes 3.72 5.74 71 
 No 3.79 6.18 50 
 Total 3.75 5.90 121 
Severe Child Yes 5.56 6.24 36 
No 7.37 7.25 32 
Total 6.41 6.75 68 
Adult Yes 5.75 7.05 36 
No 7.46 7.98 34 
Total 6.58 7.51 70 
Total Yes 5.65 6.61 72 
 No 7.41 7.58 66 
 Total 6.45 7.12 138 
Total Child Yes 4.86 5.79 72 
No 5.91 6.46 55 
Total 5.32 6.08 127 
Adult Yes 4.53 6.72 71 
No 5.8 7.88 61 
Total 5.11 7.28 132 
Total Yes 4.67 6.25 143 
 No 5.85 7.21 116 
 Total 5.21 6.71 259 
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recommended sentence length.  
Hypothesis 9 re-evaluated hypotheses 3 through 8 by adding the instruction factor to 
determine if the effects of the other independent variables are mitigated. A hierarchical linear 
regression, using a stepwise design, was employed to measure the significance of the instruction 
variable on verdict confidence. Table 12 presents the model summary with the associated 
coefficients. The results of the regression model showed that only intentionality significantly 
contributed to verdict confidence. The results did not deviate from those presented in Table 4. 
Paired with the non-significant contribution to the model, it is evident that instruction, β = -.317, 
p = .751, did not affect verdict confidence scores when harm, victim, and intentionality were 
accounted for.  
Table 12 
Model Summary of Hierarchical Linear Regression (DV = Verdict Confidence) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -1.765 .930  -1.898 .059   
Harm .403 .414 .040 .972 .332 .980 1.021 
Victim -.337 .411 -.034 -.819 .414 .990 1.010 
Intentionality* 2.563 .143 .749 17.933 .000 .970 1.031 
2 (Constant) -1.590 1.081  -1.471 .143   
Instruction -.131 .413 -.013 -.317 .751 .992 1.008 
Harm .412 .416 .041 .991 .323 .974 1.026 
Victim -.332 .412 -.033 -.806 .421 .989 1.012 
Intentionality* 2.561 .143 .749 17.863 .000 .967 1.034 
*p < .001. 
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A second hierarchical model was applied to examine the effects of instruction on 
recommended sentence length. The overall model was significant, and harm severity, as well as 
intentionality, significantly contributed to the overall model. Table 13 exhibits the breakdown of 
the coefficients for the hierarchical model and does not deviate from the findings displayed in 
Table 9. Instruction did not enter as a significant predictor in the overall model, β = .093, p 
= .099, and therefore, it is evident that instruction did not influence the effects of harm, victim, or 
intentionality on recommended sentence length. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13 
Model Summary of Hierarchical Linear Regression (DV = Sentence Length) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -1.349 1.711 
 
-0.788 0.431 
  
Harm* 1.991 0.762 .148 2.611 .010 .980 1.021 
Victim -.719 0.757 -.054 -.950 .343 .990 1.010 
Intentionality** 1.825 0.263 .396 6.938 .000 .970 1.031 
2 (Constant) -3.016 1.980 
 
-1.523 .219 
  
Instruction 1.255 .757 .093 1.657 .099 .992 1.008 
Harm* 1.900 .762 .142 2.949 .013 .974 1.026 
Victim -.762 .755 -.057 -1.010 .314 .989 1.012 
Intentionality** 1.847 .263 .401 7.037 .000 .967 1.034 
*p < .05. **p < .001. 
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Additional Analyses 
Although just-world beliefs (Lerner & Miller, 1978) might explain the observed findings, 
no direct hypotheses were posited regarding the just-world scale (JWS) (Rubin & Peplau, 1975). 
Rubin and Peplau posit that there are individual differences in belief in a just world. JWS score is 
an indication of belief in a just world, with higher scores representing a stronger belief in a just 
world. Thus, a related research question is whether participants with a stronger belief in a just 
world respond differently to the experimental manipulations than participants with weaker belief 
in a just world. However, an analysis of participants’ scores on the JWS was not found to 
significantly affect participants’ verdict confidence responses to manipulation of the independent 
variables. However, performance on the JWS significantly predicted recommended sentence 
length, β = .112, p = .045, with participants scoring higher on the JWS indicating longer prison 
sentences. See Appendix H for an analysis incorporating performance on the JWS. 
Seventy-eight participants failed the instruction condition IMC. While the instruction 
IMC may have been a stricter criterion by which to filter participants, it remains reasonable that 
the instruction IMC effectively screened participants who did not register the study 
manipulation. When the data were analyzed with those who failed the instruction IMC included, 
the results indicated similar results; however, the effects of harm on the attribution of 
intentionality did not reach significance, F = 4.01, p = .18. See Appendix F for an analysis of 
results with participants who failed the instruction IMC included.  
 Although no hypotheses were stated regarding whether participants would differ by 
condition as to whether they believed the defendant 1) intentionally injured the victim; 2) was 
responsible for starting the fire; 3) was responsible for injury to the victim; 4) was to blame for 
starting the fire; or 5) was to blame for injury to the victim, these questions were asked of 
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participants and results analyzed. Significant effects were observed for whether “the defendant 
intentionally caused injury to another person.” The analysis yielded a significant main effect for 
victim, F (1, 255) = 6.522, p = .011 (see Table I6), such that when the victim was an adult, there 
were higher intentional injury ratings (M = 1.80, SD = 1.27) than when the victim was a child (M 
= 1.46, SD =.85). See Appendix I for analysis of these findings. 
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Discussion 
 
This study hypothesized that participants would attribute greater intentionality to a 
defendant’s actions when the harm resulting from a crime was more severe. Results of a factorial 
analysis of variance indicated that this hypothesis was supported. Participants were more likely 
to attribute intentionality to actions that resulted in more severe harm. This finding is consistent 
with previous research showing that greater intentionality is attributed to actions that resulted in 
more negative outcomes (Alicke, 2000; Malle and Knobe, 1997). People more readily ascribed 
intentionality to bad actions compared to good ones (Knobe & Burra, 2006), and  negative 
emotions toward an agent can influence ascriptions of intentionality (Malle and Nelson, 2003). 
Because intentionality is often the primary component of mens rea, this finding reveals that 
individuals are more likely to find that one of the elements of the crime has been proven when a 
defendant is accused of a crime that resulted in more severe harm.  
Greater attribution of intentionality when harm is more severe can be explained in light of 
the just-world theory (Lerner & Miller, 1978). A motivation to believe that the world is 
predictable and orderly can cause people to take action to reduce perceived injustice when 
options to do so are available. In the present study, when there was more severe harm, and 
therefore a greater injustice, participants were more inclined to believe that the defendant acted 
intentionally and was, therefore, culpable. Finding the defendant acted intentionally mitigates the 
degree to which the events that occurred were random. If participants were to view the harm that 
occurred as a fluke, or the result of chance, this would be indicative of a chaotic world. Instead, 
by viewing the fire as the result of intentional human action (as opposed to mere carelessness), 
an action for which the perpetrator is being held accountable, it mitigates the unpredictability and 
the perceived injustice.  
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Although this finding demonstrates that participant judgments about an element of the 
crime (mens rea) were biased by the severity of resulting harm, it does not suggest that 
participants disregarded their prescribed role as factfinder. As directed, participants based their 
verdict decisions on whether they found mens rea and actus reus to be proven; however, their 
execution of that directive was affected by the severity of harm that occurred. As discussed 
below, the findings for verdict confidence scores provide insight into how harm severity 
specifically affected jurors’ verdict decisions.    
 The second hypothesis was that participants would attribute greater intentionality to a 
defendant’s actions when the victim of the harm was a child compared to when the victim adult. 
Results of a factorial analysis of variance indicated that this hypothesis was not supported. In 
fact, although not significant, a marginal trend was observed in the opposite direction from what 
was predicted. Marginally greater attribution of intentionality was attributed to the defendant’s 
actions when the victim was an adult. One possible interpretation of this result is that a child 
victim harmed as the result of an intentional act would be perceived as a greater injustice than 
would a child victim harmed as the result of an accident. There are multiple means by which 
people can reduce perceived injustice. While one method is holding the defendant accountable, 
in this circumstance, believing that the defendant acted intentionally may have increased the 
perceived injustice, even if it would have reduced the perception of chaos. Further support for 
this interpretation is participants’ responses to whether the defendant intentionally caused injury 
to another person. Although no hypotheses were made for this measure, participants were 
significantly more likely to agree that the defendant intentionally caused injury to another person 
when the victim was an adult as opposed to a child. Mitigating perceived injustice could have 
taken the form of reducing the belief that the act was intentional or that causing injury was 
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intentional, instead of believing that the act was intentional and holding the defendant 
accountable. 
 The second research question was whether the severity of harm, attribution of 
intentionality, and victim influenced belief in guilt. It was hypothesized that participants would 
have a greater belief in the defendant’s guilt, indicated by verdict confidence scores, when the 
resulting harm was more severe and when greater intentionality was attributed to the defendant’s 
actions. Results of a multiple linear regression analysis found that while harm did not directly 
predict verdict confidence when intentionality and victim were also entered simultaneously into 
the model, greater intentionality did lead to stronger belief in defendant’s guilt. 
Mediation analysis suggested that the effect of harm was obfuscated by the effect of 
intentionality on verdict confidence. The analysis demonstrated a full mediation of intentionality 
for the relationship between harm severity and verdict confidence. Harm severity indirectly 
affected the final outcome of verdict confidence suggesting that participants were, in part, 
abiding by the court’s direction when making verdict decisions. Participants based their verdict 
decisions on determinations of mens rea and actus reus. Given that determining a culpable 
mental state of a defendant is within the purview of jurors, the present findings provide support 
for the conclusions that verdict decisions are based on proper criteria. Since harm only indirectly 
affected verdict decisions, participants may have been following the instruction regarding how to 
arrive at their decisions, but their ability to determine the elements were biased by the severity of 
harm. In a criminal trial, more severe harm may lead to greater belief in guilt, but not because 
jurors are rejecting their prescribed role as factfinders. These findings do not suggest that this is 
an example of jury nullification (Scheflin, 1972), whereby jurors disagree with how they are to 
apply the law and instead render a verdict that they believe is fair. Instead, the present findings 
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support that jurors are making decisions within the scope of their prescribed role, but that their 
judgments about whether the elements of the crime have been met are influenced by the severity 
of the harm that occurred. If it were only observed that participants were more likely to find a 
defendant culpable when greater harm occurred, but was not mediated by intentionality 
attributions, it would have been unclear as to whether participants were following the instruction 
to base verdict decisions on mens rea and actus reus requirements. However, because verdict 
decisions were mediated by intentionality attributions, and because the act reus was essentially 
stipulated to, this supports the contention that participants based verdict decisions on the criteria 
they were instructed to. It was observed that participants followed instruction to decide 
culpability based on whether they believed that the mens rea and actus reus requirements to have 
been met. to the instruction. The implications for the court system are that the application of the 
probative versus prejudicial standard should be further reevaluated. Asking jurors to set aside 
prejudicial information may not be within their capability, despite their efforts to do so.  
The fifth hypotheses in the study proposed that participants would have a greater belief in 
defendant’s guilt when the victim of the harm was a child as opposed to an adult. Results of a 
multiple linear regression analysis indicated that this hypothesis was not supported.  
The third research question was whether severity of harm, attribution of intentionality, 
and type of victim influenced the level of deserved punishment, as indicated by recommended 
sentence length. It was hypothesized that longer sentence lengths would be recommended for a 
defendant when the crime resulted in more severe harm. Results of a multiple linear regression 
analysis indicated that this hypothesis was supported. The seventh hypothesis was that longer 
sentence lengths would be recommended for a defendant when greater intentionality was 
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attributed to their actions. Results of a multiple linear regression analysis indicated that this 
hypothesis was supported.  
Longer sentences were recommended for a defendant when the resulting harm was more 
severe and when there was greater attribution of intentionality to the defendant’s actions. These 
findings are consistent with the justification model (Alicke, 2000), in that extreme outcomes 
provoke feelings of injustice in those tasked with determining responsibility and delivering 
punishment. To manage the resulting psychological discomfort, people then attribute 
responsibility and apply a punishment they view as commensurate with the degree of injustice. 
Tostain and Lebreuilly (2005) suggested that the justification model met one’s need to believe 
that outcomes derive from intended action and, therefore, remain within human control. 
Similarly, the just-world theory (Lerner & Miller, 1978) is consistent with these results, 
suggesting that participants may have recommended harsher punishment to the defendant to 
restore a just state. 
Additional exploratory analyses examined the relationship between the JWS (Just World 
Scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1975) and the study variables. Specifically, would participant’s JWS 
score predict the effects of the experimental manipulations. The hypothesized findings did not 
differ based on participants’ JWS score, however, participants who scored higher on the JWS 
were significantly more likely to recommend longer sentences overall. This finding supports the 
just-world theory (Lerner & Miller, 1978), such that participants who have a stronger inclination 
to mitigate perceived injustice would award harsher punishment overall than participants with a 
weaker inclination to do so.  
Given that harm only indirectly affected verdict decisions, the fact that harm and 
intentionality both significantly affected recommended sentence further supports that participants 
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were attempting to abide by their role as factfinder despite an inclination to reduce the perceived 
injustice. While participants may have had a greater desire to see a defendant punished when 
harm was more severe, they still abided by their role as factfinders when making verdict 
decisions. When more severe harm resulted from the crime, participants did as instructed and 
based their verdict decisions on their determination of mens rea and actus reus. When it came to 
meting out punishment, participants’ decisions were not confined by their determination of 
elements. This demonstrates that despite a motivation to mitigate injustice and punish a 
defendant, jurors will attempt to follow instructions and make decisions based on the elements of 
the crime that are presented.  
The eighth hypotheses in the study predicted that longer sentences would be 
recommended for a defendant when the victim of the harm was a child as opposed to an adult. 
Results of a multiple linear regression analysis indicated that this hypothesis was not supported.  
 The fourth research question examined whether providing an instruction not to allow the 
harm that occurred or the type of victim influenced judgments. The ninth hypothesis examined 
whether instructions to not allow the level of harm that occurred or the type of victim to 
influence their judgments, would mitigate any significant effects. Using a series of hierarchical 
linear regressions, the instruction variable was added to see if the inclusion of the variable 
affected any of the significant observed findings. The presence of an instruction did not 
significantly affect the relationships between the independent and dependent variables.  
 Consistent with previous research (Steblay, et al., 2006) an instruction to disregard 
specific information, not allowing said information to affect decision-making, was shown to be 
ineffective. An instruction did not mitigate the effect of harm or attribution of intentionality on 
verdict confidence or recommended sentence length. Despite being provided with an instruction 
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not to allow the harm that occurred to affect their judgments, more severe harm contributed to 
greater attribution of intentionality, which then, in turn, contributed to a greater belief in guilt. 
Additionally, despite an instruction, more severe harm and greater attribution of intentionality 
predicted harsher punishment. Participants were unable to set aside specific information and 
prevent it from influencing their judgments.  
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
The findings of this study support that the severity of harm resulting from an alleged 
crime may affect judgements of culpability. Attribution of intentionality, often a primary 
component of the mens rea requirement. In this study, harm severity was found to have had an 
indirect effect on verdict decisions, which supports the conclusion that participants base 
decisions on assessment of culpability on attribution of intentionality. More severe harm and 
greater attribution of intentionality predict longer recommended sentences, demonstrating a 
greater motivation to punish. While this finding supports a greater inclination to punish when the 
harm is more severe, it also highlights the contrast between the finding for recommended 
sentence and verdict decisions. While harsher punishment was a direct result of the degree of 
harm, verdict confidence decisions were not. Despite an individual’s increased willingness to 
punish when more severe harm occurred, they followed the instruction on how to arrive at their 
verdict decision. Participants worked within the parameters provided when deciding verdicts. 
Although participants did adhere to instructions regarding on what they are to base their verdict 
determinations, they were unable to regulate what influences their judgments. A notable caveated 
to this finding is that when dichotomous verdict decisions were analyzed, there was a direct 
effect of harm on dichotomous verdict. However, a dichotomous measure is arguably not as 
sensitive a measure as verdict confidence scores. An instruction on what questions to answer 
 53 
when determining guilt, and an instruction on regulating what influences one’s judgments are 
different. Instructing participants to not allow specific information to influence their decisions 
may extend beyond the capability of individuals in these circumstances. In criminal trials, 
information, such as the harm that has occurred, should be considered potentially biasing and 
prejudicial to the degree that it prevents a defendant from receiving a fair trial. As Tostain and 
Lebreuilly (2005) described, when outcome severity is high, people are more likely to apply the 
justification model, whereas when outcome severity is low, they will use the rational model. The 
present findings support this division. When the defendant was accused of more severe harm, the 
application of the justification model results in a greater a greater likelihood of finding a 
defendant culpable. However, when the harm was less severe, there was a greater inclination to 
use the rational model—weighing the evidence and then determining a verdict.  
In an effort to limit the biasing effect of severe harm, the courts may consider various 
forms of bifurcation, where the factfinders are only provided limited information that is needed 
to decide specific factual questions in dispute. There are many circumstances where the 
feasibility of limiting information about the harm that occurred would be challenging. However, 
if the courts moved in the direction of considering what influences jurors’ decisions, based on 
empirical evidence, it could result in a greater adherence to the fundamental principles of the 
judicial system. The courts have demonstrated awareness that specific information can affect 
jurors’ judgments in a way that interferes with the execution of their charge. It is the trial court’s 
purview to determine if the prejudicial value of evidence outweighs its probative value. The 
present findings suggest that knowledge about the harm that occurred may bias the jury. When 
the harm that occurred is severe, the harm that occurred may be considered prejudicial. Given the 
legal provision that the probative value of information muse outweigh its prejudicial effect, the 
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present study demonstrates that the courts need an empirically driven assessment of what should 
be considered prejudicial. These findings support that the scope of what is considered prejudicial 
evidence is in need of expansion. Doing so would reduce the degree to which specific 
information (i.e., harm severity) affects belief in culpability. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
This study found no significant effect for victim (whether child or adult) on the 
attribution of intentionality, verdict confidence scores, or recommended sentence length. 
Although it was predicted that when the victim was a child, greater intentionality would be 
attributed to the defendant’s actions, the data suggest a non-significant result in the opposite 
direction; greater intentionality was attributed to a defendants’ actions when the victim was an 
adult. In addition to the possible explanation that a child intentionally harmed is perceived as a 
greater injustice than a child accidently harmed, this could be the result of the manipulation of 
the child and adult condition lacking salience. The fact that in the adult condition, it was 
unspecified whether the person harmed was a child or an adult, could have left participant not 
knowing the ager of the victim. It would be worthwhile for future research to examine whether 
there is a difference when the victim was an adult or child with a clearly identified distinction 
between the conditions.  
Participants in this study were recruited through Amazon’s MTurk. As discussed above, 
some researchers have found that MTurk participants perform more poorly than undergraduate 
participants, but that using IMCs serve as an effective remedy (Goodman, et al., 2013). Eleven 
participants were omitted from the analysis because they did not pass the victim IMC. Given the 
brief nature of the procedure and the limited amount of text that participants were required to 
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read, participants failing this IMC were likely not even minimally attending to the study 
materials and, therefore, would not have appreciated the study manipulations. The instruction 
IMC yielded a substantially higher failure rate than the victim IMC. Seventy-eight participants 
did not correctly identify whether or not they were provided an instruction. The high rate of 
failure for the instruction IMC may have been, in part, to the difficulty for participants to identify 
to which instructions the IMC question was referring. Further, the fact that whether the victim 
was a child versus an adult being repeated several times could have resulted in the manipulation 
having a stronger effect. Because all participants were given some form of instructions, there 
may have been some confusion for participants. However, among those who failed the 
instruction manipulation check, it was not possible to distinguish those who simply did not 
understand the manipulation check item from those who did not register that the instruction was 
provided. Given that 259 participants did correctly identify their experimental condition, it was 
decided that the more conservative analysis, despite the reduction in power, would be used to 
ensure that the sample appreciated the experimental manipulations. Although the use of an 
MTurk sample was appropriate to answer the questions in this study, future studies could address 
the issue further by using an alternative in-person method, where participants are read an 
instruction. This type of procedure would likely limit the number of participants who do not 
appreciate experimental manipulation.  
An analysis conducted with participants who failed the instruction IMC included differed 
from the analyses with these participants excluded. With these participants included, harm did 
not significantly affect attribution of intentionality. However, as argued by Goodman, et al. 
(2013), the use of an MTurk sample, unchecked by IMCs, poses a greater likelihood of non-
significant findings, due to the addition of statistical noise. Including these participants, most of 
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whom failed to appreciate the experimental manipulation, is additional noise that could obscure 
significant findings of the study. 
As predicted, an instruction to not allow the harm that occurred or sympathy for the 
victim to influence the verdict judgments was not an effective remedy for the observed 
significant findings. Despite the fact that all participants included in the analysis passed the IMC, 
indicating an understanding that harm and victim were not to guide their decision-making, the 
instruction failed to remedy the effects of harm and the attribution of intentionality. While it 
could be argued that the instruction given was not effective in directing participants to disregard 
the harm, including participants who correctly indicated the presence or absence of an instruction 
is evidence that, at some level, participants registered what was being asked of them.  
When verdict decisions were re-evaluated with dichotomous verdicts as the measure of 
verdict, the findings differed slightly from what was observed for verdict confidence scores. 
Both more severe harm and greater attribution of intentionality significantly predicted more 
guilty verdicts; however, only the attribution of intentionality predicted verdict confidence 
scores. While this finding suggests that harm, as well as intentionality, may directly affect 
verdicts, it should be noted that dichotomous verdicts are not as precise a metric as verdict 
decisions. Verdict confidence scores, by integrating confidence in the verdict decision, allow for 
a more sensitive measure of the strength of the belief in verdicts as well. Jurors who are less 
confident in their verdict decision may be more willing to change their position after deliberating 
with their fellow jurors.  
 A limitation of the present findings is that in a courtroom setting, jurors are likely to be 
more aware of the gravity of the circumstances, both from situational cues and because of the 
realism that a persons’ liberty is at stake. When jurors hear the instructions provided by a judge, 
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as opposed to reading them online while free from these social circumstances, they may be more 
likely to comply. Further investigation of the effectiveness of an instruction, under circumstances 
that can approximate the realism of the courtroom, could aid in determining the effectiveness of 
an instruction.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
Greater intentionality was attributed to a defendant when the harm that resulted from a 
crime was more severe. Jurors’ determinations of the elements of the crime, i.e., mens rea, 
contribute to a greater belief in guilt. The next step in addressing the impact of harm on verdict 
decisions is to explore various remedies for the effect. Bifurcation is potentially an effective 
remedy. Segmenting the role of the factfinders in order to limit the presence of potentially 
biasing information, could potentially increase the effectiveness and fairness of the 
administration of justice; however, such an improvement would need to be empirically tested.  
 Although victim’s age did not significantly effect the attribution of intentionally, verdict 
decisions, or sentencing recommendations, these finding may be related to the experimental 
design that was used to disentangle the act and the outcome. Further research could be developed 
to identify under what other circumstances the age of the victim, as well as other characteristics, 
could alter how juror determinations are made. These findings would demonstrate that there are 
situational as well as dispositional factors that can determine how the case is interpreted and 
what effect they have on the administration of justice.  
The lack of significant findings related to the victim might be further examined by 
conducting a similar study with victims that differed more significantly in terms of perceived 
innocence. As suggested earlier, the adult victim in this study’s vignettes might not have been 
appreciably less innocent compared to the child victim. This hypothesis could be examined by 
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comparing effects of a child victim against an adult victim with characteristics that elicit 
perceptions of being more deserving or less innocent.  
The applicability of this study’s findings to real world conditions could be examined in 
future research. Instead of using vignettes to acquaint participants with court case information, a 
future study could survey participants about perceptions of defendants in actual court cases. 
Multimedia could be used to acquaint participants with the defendants and the circumstances of 
their cases, and surveys could then be completed to measure perceptions related to harm, 
defendant guilt, and sentencing appropriateness. Further, the present study does not examine the 
what effect the deliberation process would have on jurors’ views. Future research could examine 
whether the deliberation process mitigates the present findings.  
The present study examined what effect harm severity and the age of the victim had on 
judgments pertaining to a crime presently under consideration. However, the effects of harm on 
intentionality and verdict decisions may carry over to judgments in future cases. As Saltzstein, 
Sanvitale, and Supraner (1978) found, when participants believed that a defendant acted with 
intentionally, and awarded harsher sentences, those effects carried over to judgments in 
subsequent cases. Participants were harsher in their sentences in later cases. These findings 
suggest that, as a result of greater harm, participants may be inclined to attribute greater 
intentionality to a defendant’s actions in future cases, even when the harm that resulted is not as 
severe. A motivation to mitigate the injustice of the circumstances could affect future 
determinations of intentionality and culpability. A future study could examine the result of these 
potential transfer effects. Does the exposure to greater harm in one situation result in participants 
being more likely to find a defendant’s actions intentional, or view a defendant as more culpable, 
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in future situations? Such a finding would imply that participants’ inclinations to mitigate 
injustice may persist beyond the present case into future evaluations. 
Finally, an intervention study might be a useful complement to this study’s findings. An 
intervention could be developed that was aimed at sensitizing potential jurors to the cognitive 
biases that might unduly affect their decision-making. In this study, an instruction was not found 
to be an effective safeguard to prevent the information about the harm that occurred from 
affecting verdict decisions. The instruction directed participants to regulate how specific 
knowledge affects their judgments, which is arguably outside of their capability. However, there 
are other forms of instruction that could be more effective at limiting the biasing effect of 
information. As Brehm (1966) demonstrated, when mock jurors were told that inadmissible 
evidence was to be ignored because it was non-credible, the inadmissible evidence did not affect 
verdict decisions; however, when they were instructed to disregard the evidence because it 
violated a procedural protocol, it did affect verdict decisions. An instruction may be more 
effective if participants are provided an explanation that calls the veracity of the information into 
question. Providing a rationale relating to the veracity of specific information for why the 
specific information should be disregarded may be more effective in mitigating the effects of 
harm. The risk of unjustly convicting innocent defendants based on severity of harm resulting 
from the alleged crime could be emphasized during the intervention. The effects of such an 
intervention on juror decision-making could be examined using pre- and post-tests and/or a 
control group. Exploring these options could shed greater light on a method to mitigate the 
observed findings.  
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Appendix A 
Descriptive Statistics for Participants Excluded from Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1 
   
Mean Verdict Confidence Scores for Excluded Participants   
Harm Victim Instructions Mean SD N 
Mild Child Yes 2.75 1.71 4 
No 6.71 7.3 17 
Total 5.95 6.76 21 
Adult Yes 9.4 9.71 5 
No 5.63 4.54 16 
Total 6.52 6.09 21 
Total Yes 6.44 7.78 9 
 No 6.18 6.05 33 
 Total 6.24 6.36 42 
Severe Child Yes 3.8 1.3 5 
No 7.61 6.91 18 
Total 6.78 6.31 23 
Adult Yes 2.5 2.12 2 
No 3.14 1.88 14 
Total 3.06 1.84 16 
Total Yes 3.43 1.52 7 
 No 5.66 5.73 32 
 Total 5.26 5.28 39 
Total Child Yes 3.33 1.5 9 
No 7.17 7.01 35 
Total 6.39 6.46 44 
Adult Yes 7.43 8.66 7 
No 4.47 3.72 30 
Total 5.03 5 37 
Total Yes 5.13 5.97 16 
 No 5.92 5.85 65 
 Total 5.77 5.85 81 
Note. Verdict confidence scores (Scale: 1 to 22) are a composite measure of dichotomous 
verdicts and confidence in verdict. Higher scores indicate greater confidence in guilt.  
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Table A2    
Mean Intentionality Ratings for Excluded Participants   
Harm Victim Instructions Mean SD N 
Mild Child Yes 2.5 1.92 4 
No 3.18 1.94 17 
Total 3.05 1.91 21 
Adult Yes 3.4 2.61 5 
No 3.06 1.48 16 
Total 3.14 1.74 21 
Total Yes 3 2.24 9 
 No 3.12 1.71 37 
 Total 3.1 1.81 42 
Severe Child Yes 2 0 5 
No 3.33 1.75 18 
Total 3.04 1.64 23 
Adult Yes 1.5 0.71 2 
No 1.79 0.8 14 
Total 1.75 0.78 16 
Total Yes 1.86 .38 7 
 No 2.66 1.6 32 
 Total 2.51 1.49 39 
Total Child Yes 2.22 1.2 9 
No 3.26 1.82 35 
Total 3.05 1.75 44 
Adult Yes 2.86 2.34 7 
No 2.47 1.36 30 
Total 2.54 1.56 37 
Total Yes 2.5 1.75 16 
 No 2.89 1.66 65 
 Total 2.81 1.67 81 
Note. Higher intentionality ratings represent greater attribution of intentionality (Scale: 1 to 7). 
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Table A3    
Mean Recommended Sentence Length for Excluded Participants   
Harm Victim Instructions Mean SD N 
Mild Child Yes 3.67 5.05 4 
No 5.67 6.19 17 
Total 5.27 5.94 21 
Adult Yes 7.14 9.11 5 
No 8.04 9.89 16 
Total 7.82 9.49 21 
Total Yes 5.56 7.39 9 
 No 6.82 8.15 37 
 Total 6.55 7.92 42 
Severe Child Yes 5.71 1.96 5 
No 9.52 8.49 18 
Total 8.7 7.68 23 
Adult Yes 0 0 2 
No 6.38 8.54 14 
Total 5.58 8.24 16 
Total Yes 4.08 3.21 7 
 No 8.15 8.52 32 
 Total 7.42 7.96 39 
Total Child Yes 4.76 3.57 9 
No 7.65 7.61 35 
Total 7.06 7.04 44 
Adult Yes 5.1 8.21 7 
No 7.26 9.16 30 
Total 6.85 8.92 37 
Total Yes 4.91 5.81 16 
 No 7.47 8.3 65 
 Total 6.97 7.9 81 
Note. Longer recommended sentences represent greater deserved punishment (Scale: 0 to 25 
years). 
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Table A4    
Dichotomous Verdicts for Excluded Participants   
Harm Victim Instructions Not Guilty Guilty N 
Mild Child Yes 4 0 4 
No 13 4 17 
Total 17 4 21 
Adult Yes 3 2 5 
No 14 2 16 
Total 17 4 21 
Total Yes 7 2 9 
 No 27 6 33 
 Total 34 8 42 
Severe Child Yes 5 0 5 
No 14 4 18 
Total 19 4 23 
Adult Yes 2 0 2 
No 14 0 14 
Total 16 0 16 
Total Yes 7 0 7 
 No 28 4 32 
 Total 35 4 39 
Total Child Yes 9 0 9 
No 27 8 35 
Total 36 8 44 
Adult Yes 5 2 7 
No 28 2 30 
Total 33 4 37 
Total Yes 14 2 16 
 No 55 10 65 
 Total 69 12 81 
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Appendix B 
Study Case Summary 
 
Please read the following description of a criminal case. Below you will read a short description 
of the case. In this case, you are to act as a juror who is to decide the verdict and, if appropriate, 
the sentence based on the description that you read. 
 
IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT YOU READ ALL OF THE MATERIALS BELOW 
VERY CAREFULLY. 
 
Initial Instructions: 
 
It is your duty as a juror to determine the facts in this case and then apply the law to the facts (as 
you find them). Below, the law will be provided to you in the form of a criminal charge, and then 
you must determine if the evidence supports the charge for which the defendant is accused. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSTRUCTION PRESENT CONDITION 
The following instruction was provided in the Instruction Present Condition.  
IMPORTANT: 
 
• You must not allow any feelings or judgments about the harm that has been caused or sympathy 
that you may have for the victim to influence your decision about the facts of the case. 
• You must decide the case solely on the evidence and the law before you. 
• Again it is very important that you not allow your personal feelings about the harm that occurred 
to influence your verdict decision. 
 
INSTRUCTION ABSENT CONDITION 
No addition instruction was provided in the Instruction Absent condition. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
I will now provide you with the charge for which the defendant is accused: 
 
 
Arson, First Degree— 
 
The defendant, is accused of one count of Arson in the First Degree. Under our law, a person is 
guilty of Arson in the First Degree when that person intentionally damages a building by causing 
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a fire, and when such a fire causes physical injury to another person.  
 
In order for you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, the People are required to prove, from 
all of the evidence in the case, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant, intentionally caused a 
fire, which caused physical injury to another person. 
 
On the other hand, if you find that the People have not proven beyond a reasonable doubt any 
one or more of those elements, you must find the defendant not guilty of the crime of Arson in the 
First Degree as charged in the count.  
 
As the jury you are to limit your judgment to a determination of the facts. You are to determine 
whether the defendant committed the act and whether he did so intentionally. Both of the 
elements are required for a guilty verdict. Next you will read a brief summary of case you are 
to decide. 
 
James Parker stands accused of arson in the First Degree.  
 
Below are facts that both sides agree to: 
 
• On the afternoon of February 7th, 2013, at 3:00 PM, James Parker went to a meeting with Luis 
Cardoza, the property manager of the Silver Oaks apartment complex, where Mr. Parker lived. In 
that meeting, Mr. Cardoza informed Mr. Parker that he was being fined $150 for parking in 
another tenant’s parking stall. According to Mr. Cardoza, Mr. Parker was very upset about the 
fine when he left the meeting. At 3:15 PM, Mr. Cardoza says that he watched through a window 
as Mr. Parker walked out of his office. Mr. Cardoza then watched Mr. Parker smoke a cigarette 
near the fence of the apartment complex’s property. Mr. Cardoza then watched Mr. Parker throw 
the cigarette in to the trashcan. Fifteen minutes later when the property manager looked out the 
window he saw that the trashcan was on fire and was spreading to the building next door. He 
immediately called the fire department. When the fire department arrived, the fire had already 
spread to the building next door.  
• As the Fire Marshall will testify, there is forensic evidence that the fire originated from a lit 
cigarette being thrown into the trashcan. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SEVERE HARM/CHILD CONDITION 
The result of Mr. Parker’s actions was that the fire spread to a building next door where a child 
was harmed. Although the child did not suffer any burns, the child did suffer serious smoke 
inhalation resulting in a 3-week hospitalization and will require the use of oxygen, indefinitely. 
 
 
MILD HARM/CHILD CONDITION 
 66 
 
The result of Mr. Parker’s actions was that the fire spread to a building next door where a child 
was harmed. Although the child did not suffer any burns, the child did suffer smoke inhalation 
resulting in a 3-hour hospital visit. 
 
SEVERE HARM/ADULT CONDITION 
The result of Mr. Parker’s actions was that the fire spread to a building next door where a person 
was harmed. Although the person did not suffer any burns, the person did suffer serious smoke 
inhalation resulting in a 3-week hospitalization and will require the use of oxygen, indefinitely. 
 
 
MILD HARM/ADULT CONDITION 
The result of Mr. Parker’s actions was that the fire spread to a building next door where a person 
was harmed. Although the person did not suffer any burns, the person did suffer smoke 
inhalation resulting in a 3-hour hospital visit. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The prosecution argues that Mr. Parker threw the lit cigarette into the trashcan to intentionally 
start the fire to retaliate against the property manager and, therefore, is guilty of arson because he 
started the fire and did so intentionally. 
• The defense does not dispute that Mr. Parker did discard the cigarette into the trashcan, and that 
it may have been lit, but that he did not intend to start the fire, and that the fire was accidental. 
The defense argues that Mr. Parker did not commit the act intentionally and, therefore, he is not 
guilty of arson. 
• According to the law, if Mr. Parker is to be found guilty of the crime of arson, it must be proved 
that Mr. Parker both committed the act of starting the fire and did so intentionally. 
• Based on the information you have read, you are to decide if Mr. Parker is guilty of the crime of 
arson in the first degree. 
• It is now time for you, the jury, to render a verdict. I will once again provide you with the 
criminal charge in this case: 
 
Arson, First Degree— 
 
The defendant, is accused of one count of Arson in the First Degree. Under our law, a person is 
guilty of Arson in the First Degree when that person intentionally damages a building by causing 
a fire, and when such a fire causes physical injury to another person.  
 
In order for you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, the People are required to prove, from 
all of the evidence in the case, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant,  intentionally caused a 
fire, which caused physical injury to another person. 
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On the other hand, if you find that the People have not proven beyond a reasonable doubt any 
one or more of those elements, you must find the defendant not guilty of the crime of Arson in the 
First Degree as charged in the count.  
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Appendix C 
Study Measures 
 
1.    For the charge of Arson in the First Degree, how do you find the defendant, James Parker? 
  
A.   Guilty  B.   Not Guilty 
 
  
   2.  How confident are you in your verdict? Rate your level of confidence in your verdict, 
from 0% (not at all confident) to 100% (extremely confident). 
  
0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 100 
Not at all Confident                                                                                    Extremely Confident 
  
 
   3. The defendant intentionally started the fire. 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7        
Strongly Disagree                                                                                              Strongly Agree 
  
   4. The defendant intentionally caused injury to another person. 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7        
Strongly Disagree                                                                                              Strongly Agree 
 
   5. The defendant is responsible for starting the fire. 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7 
Strongly Disagree                                                                                              Strongly Agree 
    
   6. The defendant is responsible for causing injury to another person. 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7 
Strongly Disagree                                                                                              Strongly Agree 
  
   7. The defendant is to blame for starting the fire. 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7 
Strongly Disagree                                                                                              Strongly Agree 
  
   8. The defendant is to blame for causing injury to another person. 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7 
Strongly Disagree                                                                                              Strongly Agree 
 
 9. How serious was the harm that occurred. 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7 
Not serious                Very serious                                                                                                                                                                     
  
   10. Please rate your political affiliation, in general. 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7 
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Very liberal                                  Moderate                                          Very conservative 
  
 
   11. Please rate your political affiliation regarding social issues. 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7 
Very liberal                                  Moderate                                          Very conservative 
    
12. Please rate your political affiliation regarding economic issues. 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7 
Very liberal                                  Moderate                                          Very conservative 
 
 
  
Just-World Scale 
 
Now, we will ask you to indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement on a 6-point 
continuum for the following set of questions. 
1. I’ve found that a person rarely deserves the reputation he has. 
2. Basically, the world is a just place. 
3. People who get “lucky breaks” have usually earned their good fortune. 
4. Careful drivers are just as likely to get hurt in traffic accidents as careless ones. 
5. It is a common occurrence for a guilty person to get off free in American courts. 
6. Students almost always deserve the grades they receive in school. 
7. Men who keep in shape have little chance of suffering a heart attack. 
8. The political candidate who sticks up for his principles rarely gets elected. 
9. It is rare for an innocent man to be wrongly sent to jail. 
10. In professional sports, many fouls and infractions never get called by the referee. 
11. By and large, people deserve what they get. 
12. When parents punish their children, it is almost always for good reasons. 
13. Good deeds often go unnoticed and unrewarded. 
14. Although evil men may hold political power for a while, in the general course of history 
good wins out. 
15. In almost any business or profession, people who do their job well rise to the top. 
16. American parents tend to overlook the things most to be admired in their children. 
17. It is often impossible for a person to receive a fair trial in the USA. 
18. People who meet with misfortune have often brought it on themselves. 
19. Crime doesn’t pay. 
20. Many people suffer through absolutely no fault of their own. 
  
  
Manipulation Checks 
  
  
1. Who was injured in the fire? 
  
A. a child 
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B. a person—it was not specified if it was a child.  
 
2. Please indicate whether the following statement is TRUE or FALSE: 
 
The initial instructions read at the beginning (the instructions that were provided by the judge) 
specifically stated that you are not to consider your reaction to the harm that occurred or the 
identity of the victim when making your determination about whether the defendant is guilty of 
arson.    
 
A. True 
B. False 
 
 
3. How severe was the harm that resulted from the fire? 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                  7       
Not at all Severe                                                                                   Extremely Severe 
 
4. Assuming the defendant was found guilty, what is your sentencing recommendation? 
0 years --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25 years 
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Appendix D 
Informed Consent 
 
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 
City University of New York Graduate Center 
Psychology 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
 
Title of Research Study: Criminal Justice Study 
 
Principal Investigator: Donal Barnard 
        Doctoral Candidate 
 
Faculty Advisor:  Herbert Saltzstein 
      Professor 
 
 
You are being asked to participate in a research study because you are a resident of the United 
States who is 18 years of age or older.  
 
Purpose:  
The purpose of this research study is to understand how people think about crimes and more 
generally, the criminal justice system. Your participation will help us to better understand the 
processes involved in our ability to represent a variety of information about an incident, and what 
people think is important when thinking about these issues. Please read this form about what 
participation entails before agreeing to be in the study.  
 
Procedures:  
If you volunteer to participate in this research study, you will be asked to complete one session, 
using your computer and this survey website, which will take approximately 30 minutes. We will 
ask you to read a summary of a trial transcript. Following this, you will be asked to respond to a 
series of questions. These include demographic questions about yourself and questions about 
your opinion on the trial proceedings that you read. There will also be survey questions about 
your personal opinions and stances on topics related to the criminal justice system, and your 
values and beliefs about politics. 
 
Time Commitment: 
Your participation in this research study is expected to last for approximately 30 minutes. 
 
Potential Risks or Discomforts:  
No physical risks are involved in this study. The risks posed to you are no greater than you 
would likely encounter reading a newspaper or magazine article. It is possible that you will 
experience some psychological discomfort as a result of thinking about crime. Considering some 
of these topics may cause you to feel unpleasant emotions or remind you of negative 
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information. If you become uncomfortable with any aspect of the tasks you are asked to engage 
in, you may discontinue participation at any time.  
 
 
 
Potential Benefits:  
You will be paid $2 for your participation in this research project. Aside from that, there are no 
direct benefits to you for participating. You may find it interesting to explore your thoughts on 
the topics investigated in this study. This project is part of a larger research effort to understand 
how people think about the criminal justice system in this country. Your participation will help 
us, and the broader scientific community, to increase our understanding. 
 
Payment for Participation:  
You will be a paid participant in this study, and you will be reimbursed $2 for your participation.  
 
Confidentiality:  
All records and data resulting from your participation will be kept confidential. The results of 
your participation in this study may be used for publication or for scientific purposes, but neither 
your name nor your identity will be disclosed, and in any sort of report that we publish we will 
not include any information that may make it possible to identify a participant. All information 
will be coded and secured using a password protected electronic file. Identifying information will 
be kept separately from your responses in a way that will not allow them to be linked to your 
responses. Access to the records will be limited to the researchers; however, please note that the 
Institutional Review Board and internal City University of New York auditors may review the 
research records. The research team, authorized CUNY staff, and government agencies that 
oversee this type of research may have access to research data and records in order to monitor 
the research. Research records provided to authorized, non-CUNY individuals will not contain 
identifiable information about you.  
 
Participants’ Rights:  
Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary. If you decide not to participate, 
there will be no penalty to you, and you may discontinue participation without penalty at any 
time. If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw your consent and discontinue at any 
time, for any reason. If you choose not to participate or to withdraw, it will in no way affect your 
current or future relations with the MTurk survey service.  
 
Questions, Comments or Concerns:  
This study has been reviewed the City University of New York Institutional Review Board. The 
researcher conducting this study is Donal Barnard. For questions or additional information 
concerning this research, you may contact the principal investigator by mail at the The Graduate 
Center, CUNY, 365 5th Avenue, New York, New York, 10016.  
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or you have comments or 
concerns that you would like to discuss with someone other than the researchers, please call the 
CUNY Research Compliance Administrator at 646-664-8918. Alternately, you can write to: 
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CUNY Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research 
Attn: Research Compliance Administrator 
205 East 42nd Street 
New York, NY 10017 
 
Signature of Participant: 
If you agree to participate in this research study, please sign and date below. You will be given a 
copy of this consent form to keep. 
 
_____________________________________________________    
Printed Name of Participant 
 
_____________________________________________________   
Signature of Participant       Date  
 
Signature of Individual Obtaining Consent 
 
_____________________________________________________    
Printed Name of Individual Obtaining Consent 
 
_____________________________________________________   
Signature of Individual Obtaining Consent   Date  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 74 
Appendix E 
Pilot Data Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table E1    
Mean Verdict Confidence Scores for Pilot Data    
Harm Victim Instructions Mean SD N 
Mild Child Yes 3.7 2.45 10 
No 3.5 2.65 4 
Total 3.64 2.41 14 
Adult Yes 5.2 8.32 5 
No 6.13 6.29 8 
Total 5.77 6.81 13 
Total Yes 4.2 4.92 15 
 No 5.25 5.36 12 
 Total 4.67 5.05 27 
Severe Child Yes 9.33 9.14 6 
No 6.46 6.16 13 
Total 7.37 7.1 19 
Adult Yes 6.56 7.73 9 
No 4 2.35 5 
Total 5.64 6.33 14 
Total Yes 7.67 8.12 15 
 No 5.78 5.42 18 
 Total 6.64 6.74 33 
Total Child Yes 5.81 6.27 16 
No 5.76 5.61 17 
Total 5.79 5.85 33 
Adult Yes 6.07 7.65 14 
No 5.31 5.11 13 
Total 5.71 6.44 27 
Total Yes 5.93 6.83 30 
 No 5.57 5.31 30 
 Total 5.75 6.07 60 
Note. Verdict confidence scores (Scale: 1 to 22) are a composite measure of dichotomous 
verdicts and confidence in verdict. Higher scores indicate greater confidence in guilt. 
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Table E2    
Mean Intentionality Ratings for Pilot Data    
Harm Victim Instructions Mean SD N 
Mild Child Yes 2 0.94 10 
No 1.75 0.5 4 
Total 1.93 0.83 14 
Adult Yes 2 1.73 5 
No 2.88 1.55 8 
Total 2.54 1.61 13 
Total Yes 2 1.2 15 
 No 2.5 1.38 12 
 Total 2.22 1.28 27 
Severe Child Yes 3.5 2.35 6 
No 3.15 1.82 13 
Total 3.26 1.94 19 
Adult Yes 2.67 1.66 9 
No 2 0.71 5 
Total 2.43 1.4 14 
Total Yes 3 1.93 15 
 No 2.83 1.65 18 
 Total 2.91 1.76 33 
Total Child Yes 2.56 1.71 16 
No 2.82 1.7 17 
Total 2.7 1.69 33 
Adult Yes 2.43 1.65 14 
No 2.54 1.33 13 
Total 2.48 1.48 27 
Total Yes 2.5 1.66 30 
 No 2.7 1.54 30 
 Total 2.6 1.59 60 
Note. Higher intentionality ratings represent greater attribution of intentionality (Scale: 1 to 7). 
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Table E3    
Mean Recommended Sentence Length for Pilot Data    
Harm Victim Instructions Mean SD N 
Mild Child Yes 3.57 4.45 10 
No 1.79 2.06 4 
Total 3.06 3.93 14 
Adult Yes 3.57 7.99 5 
No 7.59 9.04 8 
Total 6.04 8.55 13 
Total Yes 3.57 5.57 15 
 No 5.66 7.83 12 
 Total 4.5 6.61 27 
Severe Child Yes 8.93 5.42 6 
No 8.79 9.95 13 
Total 8.83 8.62 19 
Adult Yes 7.14 8.56 9 
No 1.43 3.19 5 
Total 5.1 7.51 14 
Total Yes 7.86 7.3 15 
 No 6.75 9.16 18 
 Total 7.25 8.26 33 
Total Child Yes 5.58 5.37 16 
No 7.14 9.19 17 
Total 6.39 7.51 33 
Adult Yes 5.87 8.24 14 
No 5.22 7.8 13 
Total 5.56 7.88 27 
Total Yes 5.71 6.74 30 
 No 6.31 8.53 30 
 Total 6.01 7.63 60 
Note. Longer recommended sentences represent greater deserved punishment (Scale: 0 to 25 
years). 
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Table E4 
   
Dichotomous Verdicts for Pilot Data    
Harm Victim Instructions Not Guilty Guilty N 
Mild Child Yes 10 0 10 
No 4 0 4 
Total 14 0 14 
Adult Yes 4 1 5 
No 7 1 8 
Total 11 2 13 
Total Yes 14 1 15 
 No 11 1 12 
 Total 25 2 27 
Severe Child Yes 4 2 6 
No 11 2 13 
Total 15 4 19 
Adult Yes 7 2 9 
No 5 0 5 
Total 12 2 14 
 Yes 11 4 15 
 No 16 2 18 
Total Total 27 6 33 
Total Child Yes 14 2 16 
No 15 2 17 
Total 29 4 33 
Adult Yes 11 3 14 
No 12 1 13 
Total 23 4 27 
Total Yes 25 5 30 
 No 27 3 30 
 Total 52 8 60 
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Appendix F 
Statistical Analysis Including Participants Failing Instruction IMC  
 
Results were analyzed with the 68 participants who failed only the instruction IMC 
included. With these participants included, the number of participants in the sample totaled 327. 
This will be denoted to as the “327-sample” and the sample with participants who failed the 
instruction manipulation check excluded as the “259-sample.”  
The 327-sample demonstrated similar results as the 259-sample with some exceptions. 
Unlike the 259-sample, harm did not reach the threshold of significance for affecting attribution 
of intentionality, F = 4.01, p = .18 (see Table F1). The relationship between intentionality and 
verdict confidence scores remained significant (β = .783, p < .000) (see Table F2). The 
relationship between harm and recommended sentence remained significant (β = .158, p = .001). 
as well as the relationship between intentionality and recommended sentence (β = .432, p < .000) 
(see Table F3). The effect of instruction did not deviate from those observed with the 259-sample 
(see Table F4 and Table F5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 79 
Table F1 
Factorial ANOVA Results (DV = Intentionality) 
Source Type III SS df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 9.786a 3 3.262 1.457 .226 
Intercept 2104.924 1 2104.924 940.339 .000 
Harm 4.011 1 4.011 1.792 .182 
Victim 0.674 1 0.674 0.301 .584 
Harm * Victim 5.494 1 5.494 2.454 .118 
Error 723.027 323 2.238     
Total 2865.000 327       
Corrected Total 732.813 326       
a. R2 = .013 (Adjusted R2= .004) 
 
Table F2 
Multiple Regression Analysis for Verdict Confidence 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -2.066 .822 -2.513 .012  
Harm .363 .353 .035 1.029 .304 .994 1.006 
Victim -.268 .353 -.026 -.783 .447 .999 1.001 
Intentionality* 2.675 .118 .783 22.720 .000 .994 1.006 
**p < .001. 
 
Table F3 
Regression Summary for Recommended Sentence Length 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -1.846 1.562 -1.182 .238  
Harm* 2.152 .671 .158     3.208 .001 .994 1.006 
Victim -.712 .668 -.052 -1.066 .287 .999 1.001 
Intentionality** 1.964 .224 .432 8.785 .000 .994 1.006 
*p < .05. **p < .001. 
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Table F4 
Model Summary of Hierarchical Linear Regression (DV= Verdict Confidence) for the 327 
Sample 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -2.066 0.822   -2.513 0.012     
Harm 0.363 0.353 0.035 1.029 0.304 0.994 1.006 
Victim -0.268 0.352 -0.026 -0.761 0.447 0.999 1.001 
Intentionality* 2.675 0.118 0.783 22.720 0.000 0.994 1.006 
2 (Constant) -1.928 0.972   -1.984 0.048     
Instruction -0.094 0.353 -0.009 -0.267 0.790 0.998 1.002 
Harm 0.367 0.354 0.036 1.037 0.300 0.992 1.008 
Victim -0.267 0.352 -0.026 -0.759 0.448 0.999 1.001 
Intentionality* 2.675 0.118 0.783 22.687 0.000 0.994 1.006 
   *p < .001. 
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Table F5 
Model Summary of Hierarchical Linear Regression (DV = Sentence Length) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -
1.846 
1.562  -1.182 .238     
Harm* 2.152 .671 .158 3.208 .001 .994 1.006 
Victim -.712 .668 -.052 -1.066 .287 .999 1.001 
Intentionality** 1.964 .224 .432 8.785 .000 .994 1.006 
2 (Constant) -
3.822 
1.834   -2.083 .038     
Instruction 1.351 .666 .099 2.028 .043 .998  
Harm* 2.095 .668 .154 3.135 .002 .992  
Victim -.717 .665 -.053 -1.078 .282 .999  
Intentionality** 1.964 .223 .432 8.828 .000 .994   
  *p < .05. **p < .001. 
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Appendix G 
Descriptive Statistics and Analysis of Dichotomous Verdicts 
 
Hypothesis 3, 4, and 5 were also analyzed for dichotomous verdict (guilty/not guilty) in 
place of verdict confidence scores as the dependent measures. A binary logistic regression was 
utilized with harm, victim, and intentionality as independent variables entered simultaneously 
into the equation. Collinearity diagnostics showed that the independent variables were not 
correlated with each other, and, therefore, there were no concerns of multicollinearity. The 
dependent variable was dichotomous verdict (guilty vs. not guilty). The results of the binary 
logistic regression in Table G1 show that harm significantly contributes to dichotomous verdict, 
Wald = 3.914, p = .048. In the severe harm condition, more participants (11.6%) found the 
defendant guilty than in the mild harm condition (5%) (see Table G2). Intentionality also 
significantly contributed to dichotomous verdict, Wald = 31.153, p < .001. When there was 
greater attribution of intentionality, participants were more likely to find the defendant guilty. 
The model could explain 67.6% of the variability in decorous verdict, based on the Nagelkerke 
R2 statistic. 
 
Table G1 
Binary Logistic Regression Analysis for Dichotomous Verdict (Guilty/ Not Guilty) 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Wald Sig. B Std. Error 
1 (Constant) -11.237 2.622 18.363 .000 
Harm* 1.787 0.903 3.914 .048 
Victim -.375 .764 .241 .624 
Intentionality** 1.709 .306 31.153 .000 
*p < .05. **p < .001. 
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Research Question 4 and its hypotheses relating to verdict confidence were re-evaluated 
for dichotomous verdict. A hierarchical binary logistic regression was utilized with level of 
harm, victim, and intentionality as independent variables entered in the first step and 
intentionality as a covariate entered in the second step. Collinearity diagnostics showed that the 
Table G2    
Dichotomous Verdicts by Condition   
Harm Victim Instructions Not Guilty Guilty N 
Mild Child Yes 35 1 36 
No 23 0 23 
Total 58 1 59 
Adult Yes 33 2 35 
No 24 3 27 
Total 57 5 62 
Total Yes 68 3 71 
 No 47 3 50 
 Total 115 6 121 
Severe Child Yes 32 4 36 
No 28 4 32 
Total 60 8 68 
Adult Yes 31 5 36 
No 31 3 34 
Total 62 8 70 
Total Yes 63 9 72 
 No 59 7 66 
 Total 122 16 138 
Total Child Yes 67 5 72 
No 51 4 55 
Total 118 9 127 
Adult Yes 64 7 71 
No 55 6 61 
Total 119 13 132 
Total Yes 131 12 143 
 No 106 10 116 
 Total 237 22 259 
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independent variables were not correlated with each other, and, therefore, there were no concerns 
of multicollinearity. The results of the binary logistic regression in Table G3 shows that only 
intentionality (Hypothesis 4) significantly contributed to verdict (Wald = 31.575, p = .000). An 
increase of one on the intentionality scale leads to an increase of 1.770 times in the odds ratio of 
finding a guilty verdict. The Nagelkerke R2 indicates that 67.6% of the variability in 
dichotomous verdict could be accounted for by the model.  
 
Table G3 
Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analysis for Verdict (Guilty/ Not Guilty) with Intentionality as 
Covariate. 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Wald Sig. B Std. Error 
1 (Constant) -11.237 2.622 18.363 .000 
Harm* 1.787 0.903 3.914 .048 
Victim -.375 .764 .241 .624 
Intentionality** 1.709 .306 31.153 .000 
2 (Constant) -10.693 2.559 17.468 .000 
Instruction -.975 .756 1.663 .197 
Harm* 1.720 .899 3.659 .056 
Victim -.500 .784 .407 .523 
Intentionality** 1.770 .315 31.575 .000 
  *p < .05. **p < .001. 
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Appendix H  
Analysis of Just-World Scale by Condition 
 
To examine whether participants’ performance on the JWS (Rubin & Peplau, 1975) was 
indicative of the attribution of intentionality, a median split of scores on the JWS scale divided 
participants between the upper 50th percentile, high JWS, and the lower 50th percentile, low JWS. 
Tables H1, H2, and H3 display mean intentionality ratings, verdict confidence scores, and 
recommended sentence lengths by condition for the JWS split, respectively. 
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Table H1 
Mean Intentionality Ratings for JWS Split by Condition  
Harm Victim Instruction JWS Split Mean SD N 
Mild Child Yes Low 2.14 .95 14 
High 2.05 1.21 22 
Total 2.08 1.11 36 
No  Low 2.08 1.12 13 
High 1.80 .63 10 
Total 1.96 .93 23 
Total Low 2.11 1.01 27 
High 1.97 1.06 32 
Total 2.03 1.03 59 
Adult Yes Low 2.47 1.91 17 
High 2.39 1.69 18 
Total 2.43 1.77 35 
No Low 2.47 1.55 17 
High 3.10 2.08 10 
Total 2.70 1.75 27 
Total Low 2.47 1.71 34 
High 2.64 1.83 28 
Total 2.55 1.75 62 
Total Yes Low 2.32 1.54 31 
High 2.20 1.44 40 
Total 2.25 1.47 71 
No Low 2.30 1.37 30 
High 2.45 1.64 20 
Total 2.36 1.47 50 
Total Low 2.31 1.44 61 
High 2.28 1.50 60 
Total 2.30 1.46 121 
Severe Child Yes Low 2.58 1.30 19 
High 3.24 1.89 17 
Total 2.89 1.62 36 
No  Low 2.33 1.29 15 
High 2.47 1.23 17 
Total 2.41 1.24 32 
Total Low 2.47 1.28 34 
High 2.85 1.62 34 
Total 2.66 1.46 68 
Adult Yes Low 3.07 1.58 15 
High 2.71 1.62 21 
Total 2.86 1.59 36 
No  Low 2.82 1.24 17 
High 2.47 1.12 17 
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Total 2.65 1.18 34 
Total Low 2.94 1.39 32 
High 2.61 1.41 38 
Total 2.76 1.40 70 
Total Yes Low 2.79 1.43 34 
High 2.95 1.74 38 
Total 2.88 1.59 72 
No  Low 2.59 1.27 32 
High 2.47 1.16 34 
Total 2.53 1.21 66 
Total Low 2.70 1.35 66 
High 2.72 1.50 72 
Total 2.71 1.43 138 
Total Child Yes Low 2.39 1.17 33 
High 2.56 1.64 39 
Total 2.49 1.43 72 
No  Low 2.21 1.20 28 
High 2.22 1.09 27 
Total 2.22 1.13 55 
Total Low 2.31 1.18 61 
High 2.42 1.44 66 
Total 2.37 1.31 127 
Adult Yes Low 2.75 1.76 32 
High 2.56 1.64 39 
Total 2.65 1.68 71 
No  Low 2.65 1.39 34 
High 2.70 1.54 27 
Total 2.67 1.45 61 
Total Low 2.70 1.57 66 
High 2.62 1.59 66 
Total 2.66 1.57 132 
Total Yes Low 2.57 1.49 65 
High 2.56 1.62 78 
Total 2.57 1.56 143 
No  Low 2.45 1.31 62 
High 2.46 1.34 54 
Total 2.46 1.32 116 
Total Low 2.51 1.40 127 
High 2.52 1.51 132 
Total 2.52 1.46 259 
Note. Higher intentionality ratings represent greater attribution of intentionality (Scale: 1 to 7). 
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Table H2       
Mean Verdict Confidence Score for JWS Split by Condition  
Harm Victim Instruction JWS Split Mean SD N 
Mild Child Yes Low 3.71 1.64 14 
High 3.91 4.29 22 
Total 3.83 3.47 36 
No  Low 3.00 1.63 13 
High 3.30 2.06 10 
Total 3.13 1.79 23 
Total Low 3.37 1.64 27 
High 3.72 3.71 32 
Total 3.56 2.93 59 
Adult Yes Low 3.76 4.15 17 
High 4.39 4.59 18 
Total 4.09 4.33 35 
No Low 4.06 4.92 17 
High 6.40 7.86 10 
Total 4.93 6.13 27 
Total Low 3.91 4.48 34 
High 5.11 5.90 28 
Total 4.45 5.16 62 
Total Yes Low 3.74 3.21 31 
High 4.13 4.37 40 
Total 3.96 3.89 71 
No Low 3.60 3.84 30 
High 4.85 5.82 20 
Total 4.10 4.71 50 
Total Low 3.67 3.51 61 
High 4.37 4.86 60 
Total 4.02 4.23 121 
Severe Child Yes Low 5.11 4.31 19 
High 6.76 7.22 17 
Total 5.89 5.84 36 
No  Low 4.53 5.45 15 
High 5.47 5.37 17 
Total 5.03 5.34 32 
Total Low 4.85 4.77 34 
High 6.12 6.30 34 
Total 5.49 5.59 68 
Adult Yes Low 5.87 6.00 15 
High 6.19 6.33 21 
Total 6.06 6.11 36 
No  Low 5.71 5.74 17 
High 4.00 2.87 17 
Total 4.85 4.55 34 
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Total Low 5.78 5.77 32 
High 5.21 5.14 38 
Total 5.47 5.40 70 
Total Yes Low 5.44 5.05 34 
High 6.45 6.66 38 
Total 5.97 5.93 72 
No  Low 5.16 5.55 32 
High 4.74 4.31 34 
Total 4.94 4.91 66 
Total Low 5.30 5.26 66 
High 5.64 5.70 72 
Total 5.48 5.47 138 
Total Child Yes Low 4.52 3.47 33 
High 5.15 5.85 39 
Total 4.86 4.88 72 
No  Low 3.82 4.15 28 
High 4.67 4.51 27 
Total 4.24 4.31 55 
Total Low 4.20 3.78 61 
High 4.95 5.31 66 
Total 4.59 4.63 127 
Adult Yes Low 4.75 5.12 32 
High 5.36 5.60 39 
Total 5.08 5.36 71 
No  Low 4.88 5.33 34 
High 4.89 5.28 27 
Total 4.89 5.26 61 
Total Low 4.82 5.19 66 
High 5.17 5.43 66 
Total 4.99 5.30 132 
Total Yes Low 4.63 4.33 65 
High 5.26 5.69 78 
Total 4.97 5.11 143 
No  Low 4.40 4.82 62 
High 4.78 4.87 54 
Total 4.58 4.83 116 
Total Low 4.52 4.56 127 
High 5.06 5.35 132 
Total 4.80 4.98 259 
Note. Verdict confidence scores (Scale: 1 to 22) are a composite measure of dichotomous 
verdicts and confidence in verdict. Higher scores indicate greater confidence in guilt. 
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Table H3       
Mean Recommended Sentence Length for JWS Split by Condition  
Harm Victim Instruction JWS Split Mean SD N 
Mild Child Yes Low 3.83 4.95 14 
High 4.38 5.61 22 
Total 4.17 5.30 36 
No  Low 4.12 4.58 13 
High 3.57 4.76 10 
Total 3.88 4.56 23 
Total Low 3.97 4.68 27 
High 4.13 5.30 32 
Total 4.06 4.98 59 
Adult Yes Low 4.20 7.39 17 
High 2.38 4.90 18 
Total 3.27 6.21 35 
No Low .84 2.01 17 
High 8.57 10.41 10 
Total 3.70 7.38 27 
Total Low 2.52 5.60 34 
High 4.59 7.77 28 
Total 3.46 6.69 62 
Total Yes Low 4.03 6.30 31 
High 3.48 5.33 40 
Total 3.72 5.74 71 
No Low 2.26 3.69 30 
High 6.07 8.28 20 
Total 3.79 6.18 50 
Total Low 3.16 5.22 61 
High 4.35 6.51 60 
Total 3.75 5.90 121 
Severe Child Yes Low 5.83 7.64 19 
High 5.25 4.40 17 
Total 5.56 6.24 36 
No  Low 5.71 6.30 15 
High 8.82 7.90 17 
Total 7.37 7.25 32 
Total Low 5.78 6.98 34 
High 7.04 6.55 34 
Total 6.41 6.75 68 
Adult Yes Low 7.14 7.99 15 
High 4.76 6.32 21 
Total 5.75 7.05 36 
No  Low 7.77 8.11 17 
High 7.14 8.09 17 
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Total 7.46 7.98 34 
Total Low 7.48 7.93 32 
High 5.83 7.16 38 
Total 6.58 7.51 70 
Total Yes Low 6.41 7.70 34 
High 4.98 5.48 38 
Total 5.65 6.61 72 
No  Low 6.81 7.28 32 
High 7.98 7.92 34 
Total 7.41 7.58 66 
Total Low 6.60 7.45 66 
High 6.40 6.86 72 
Total 6.50 7.12 138 
Total Child Yes Low 4.98 6.62 33 
High 4.76 5.07 39 
Total 4.86 5.79 72 
No  Low 4.97 5.53 28 
High 6.88 7.27 27 
Total 5.91 6.46 55 
Total Low 4.98 6.09 61 
High 5.63 6.11 66 
Total 5.32 6.08 127 
Adult Yes Low 5.58 7.69 32 
High 3.66 5.76 39 
Total 4.53 6.72 71 
No  Low 4.31 6.80 34 
High 7.67 8.84 27 
Total 5.80 7.88 61 
Total Low 4.92 7.22 66 
High 5.30 7.39 66 
Total 5.11 7.28 132 
Total Yes Low 5.27 7.12 65 
High 4.21 5.42 78 
Total 4.70 6.25 143 
No  Low 4.61 6.22 62 
High 7.28 8.03 54 
Total 5.85 7.21 116 
Total Low 4.95 6.67 127 
High 5.47 6.76 132 
Total 5.21 6.71 259 
Note. Longer recommended sentences represent greater deserved punishment (Scale: 0 to 25 
years). 
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To determine if participants who were high and low on the JWS differed in their 
attribution of intentionality as a result of harm severity and victim, a two-way analysis of 
variance was utilized with intentionality ratings as the dependent measure and harm, victim, and 
JWS split as factors. No significant main effect for JWS split, F = .012, p = .912, was observed 
(see Table H4). Further, JWS split did not significantly interact with harm, F = .001, p = .978, or 
victim, F = .308, p = .580. 
 
Table H4 
Factorial ANOVA Results (DV = Intentionality) 
Source 
Type III 
SS Df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 24.448 7 3.493 1.679 .115 
Intercept 1610.823 1 1610.823 774.221 .000 
Harm* 11.204 1 11.204 5.385 .021 
Victim 6.283 1 6.283 3.020 .083 
JWS Split .026 1 .026 .012 .912 
Harm X Victim 2.655 1 2.655 1.276 .260 
Harm X JWS Split .002 1 .002 .001 .978 
Victim X JWS Split .640 1 .640 .308 .580 
Harm X Victim X JWS Split 4.241 1 4.241 2.038 .155 
Error 522.224 251 2.081   
Total 2188.000 259    
Corrected Total 546.672 258       
Note. R2 = .045 (Adjusted R2 = .018). *p < .05. 
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To determine if participants’ JWS scores affected the relationship of harm, intentionality, 
and victim on verdict confidence score, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted with 
JWS score entered as a covariate. For the regression models, the JWS score, as opposed to the 
JWS split, was entered in the model. Higher scores indicating a greater belief in a just world. The 
JWS score was not statistically significant in the model (β = .042, p = .310) with verdict 
confidence as the dependent variable and harm, victim, instruction, and JWS Score as 
independent factors (see Table H5). 
      
Table H5 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Verdict Confidence with JWS Score as a Covariate 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -1.765 .930  -1.898 .059   
Harm .403 .414 .040 .972 .332 .980 1.021 
Victim -.337 .411 -.034 -.819 .414 .990 1.010 
Intentionality** 2.563 .143 .749 17.933 .000 .970 1.031 
2 (Constant) -1.590 1.081  -1.471 .143   
Harm .412 .416 .041 .991 .323 .974 1.026 
Victim -.332 .412 -.033 -.806 .421 .989 1.012 
Intentionality** 2.561 .143 .749 17.863 .000 .967 1.034 
Instruction -.131 .413 -.013 -.317 .751 .992 1.008 
3 (Constant) -2.752 1.573  -1.749 .081   
Harm .410 .416 .041 .985 .326 .974 1.026 
Victim -.325 .412 -.033 -.788 .432 .988 1.012 
Intentionality** 2.559 .143 .748 17.850 .000 .967 1.034 
Instruction -.120 .414 -.012 -.290 .772 .992 1.008 
JWS Score .324 .319 .042 1.017 .310 .999 1.001 
  **p < .001. 
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To determine if participants’ JWS scores affected the relationship of harm, intentionality, 
and victim on recommended sentence, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted with the 
JWS score entered as a covariate. JWS score was a statistically significant predictor of 
recommended sentence, β =  .112, p = .045 (see Table H6). As JWS scores increased, so did 
length of recommended sentence. The inclusion of the JWS score into the model did not 
significantly affect the findings for harm, victim, or attribution of intentionality. 
 
Table H6 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Recommended Sentence Length with JWS Score as a 
Covariate 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -1.349 1.711  -.788 .431   
Harm* 1.991 .762 .148 2.611 .010 .980 1.021 
Victim -.719 .757 -.054 -.950 .343 .990 1.010 
Intentionality** 1.825 .263 .396 6.938 .000 .970 1.031 
2 (Constant) -3.016 1.980  -1.523 .129   
Harm* 1.900 .762 .142 2.494 .013 .974 1.026 
Victim -.762 .755 -.057 -1.010 .314 .989 1.012 
Intentionality** 1.847 .263 .401 7.037 .000 .967 1.034 
Instruction 1.255 .757 .093 1.657 .099 .992 1.008 
3 (Constant) -7.213 2.864  -2.519 .012   
Harm* 1.891 .757 .141 2.498 .013 .974 1.026 
Victim -.734 .750 -.055 -.979 .329 .988 1.012 
Intentionality** 1.841 .261 .399 7.054 .000 .967 1.034 
Instruction 1.295 .753 .096 1.720 .087 .992 1.008 
JWS Score* 1.171 .580 .112 2.018 .045 .999 1.001 
        *p < .05. **p < .001. 
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Appendix I 
Descriptive Statistics and Analysis of Additional Dependent Measures 
 
Although no hypotheses were stated for other measures of defendants’ accountability, 
these items were ascertained and analyzed. The investigation included the degree to which 
participants agreed that the defendant 1) intentionally caused injury to the victim (see Table I1); 
2) was responsible for the fire (see Table I2); 3) was responsible for injury to the victim (see 
Table I3); 4) was to blame for the fire (see Table I4); and was to blame for injury to the victim 
(see Table I5). 
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Table I1    
Mean Ratings for Intentional Injury to Victim    
Harm Victim Instructions Mean SD N 
Mild Child Yes 1.42 0.77 36 
No 1.17 0.49 23 
Total 1.32 0.68 59 
Adult Yes 1.66 1.24 35 
No 1.89 1.72 27 
Total 1.76 1.46 62 
Total Yes 1.54 1.026 71 
 No 1.56 1.343 50 
 Total 1.55 1.16 121 
Severe Child Yes 1.69 1.12 36 
No 1.44 0.76 32 
Total 1.57 0.97 68 
Adult Yes 1.72 .815 36 
No 1.94 1.32 34 
Total 1.83 1.09 70 
Total Yes 1.71 0.97 72 
 No 1.70 1.12 66 
 Total 1.70 1.04 138 
Total Child Yes 1.56 0.96 72 
No 1.33 0.67 55 
Total 1.46 0.85 127 
Adult Yes 1.69 1.04 71 
No 1.92 1.5 61 
Total 1.8 1.27 132 
Total Yes 1.62 1.00 143 
 No 1.64 1.21 116 
 Total 1.63 1.10 259 
Note: Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement that, “The defendant 
intentionally caused injury to another person.” Higher scores indicate greater agreement. Scale: 
1 to 7.  
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Table I2    
Mean Ratings for Responsibility for Fire    
Harm Victim Instructions Mean SD N 
Mild Child Yes 6 1.24 36 
No 6 1.54 23 
Total 6 1.35 59 
Adult Yes 6.17 1.22 35 
No 6.11 1.55 27 
Total 6.15 1.37 62 
Total Yes 6.08 1.23 71 
 No 6.06 1.53 50 
 Total 6.07 1.36 121 
Severe Child Yes 6.17 0.97 36 
No 6.38 1.01 32 
Total 6.26 0.99 68 
Adult Yes 5.89 1.67 36 
No 6.18 1.19 34 
Total 6.03 1.18 70 
Total Yes 6.03 1.07 72 
 No 6.27 1.10 66 
 Total 6.14 1.09 138 
Total Child Yes 6.08 1.11 72 
No 6.22 1.26 55 
Total 6.14 1.17 127 
Adult Yes 6.03 1.2 71 
No 6.15 1.35 61 
Total 6.08 1.27 132 
Total Yes 6.06 1.15 143 
 No 6.18 1.30 116 
 Total 6.11 1.22 259 
Note: Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement that, “The defendant is 
responsible for starting the fire.” Higher scores indicate greater agreement. Scale: 1 to 7. 
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Table I3    
Mean Ratings for Responsibility for Injury to Victim    
Harm Victim Instructions Mean SD N 
Mild Child Yes 5.39 1.46 36 
No 5.22 1.54 23 
Total 5.32 1.48 59 
Adult Yes 4.94 1.97 35 
No 5.48 1.87 27 
Total 5.18 1.93 62 
Total Yes 5.17 1.73 71 
 No 5.36 1.71 50 
 Total 5.25 1.72 121 
Severe Child Yes 5.11 1.55 36 
No 5.56 1.56 32 
Total 5.32 1.56 68 
Adult Yes 4.92 1.76 36 
No 5.09 2.11 34 
Total 5.00 1.93 70 
Total Yes 5.01 1.649 72 
 No 5.32 1.866 66 
 Total 5.16 1.76 138 
Total Child Yes 5.25 1.5 72 
No 5.42 1.55 55 
Total 5.32 1.52 127 
Adult Yes 4.93 1.85 71 
No 5.26 2 61 
Total 5.08 1.92 132 
Total Yes 5.09 1.686 143 
 No 5.34 1.793 116 
 Total 5.2 1.74 259 
Note: Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement that, “The defendant is 
responsible for causing injury to another person.” Higher scores indicate greater agreement. 
Scale: 1 to 7. 
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Table I4    
Mean Ratings for Blame for Fire    
Harm Victim Instructions Mean SD N 
Mild Child Yes 5.89 1.24 36 
No 6.13 1.22 23 
Total 5.98 1.23 59 
Adult Yes 5.86 1.42 35 
No 6.04 1.06 27 
Total 5.94 1.27 62 
Total Yes 5.87 1.32 71 
 No 6.08 1.12 50 
 Total 5.96 1.24 121 
Severe Child Yes 5.75 1.23 36 
No 6.03 1.31 32 
Total 5.88 1.26 68 
Adult Yes 5.89 1.19 36 
No 6.21 1.01 34 
Total 6.04 1.11 70 
Total Yes 5.82 1.20 72 
 No 6.12 1.16 66 
 Total 5.96 1.19 138 
Total Child Yes 5.82 1.23 72 
No 6.07 1.26 55 
Total 5.93 1.24 127 
Adult Yes 5.87 1.3 71 
No 6.13 1.02 61 
Total 5.99 1.18 132 
Total Yes 5.85 1.26 143 
 No 6.10 1.14 116 
 Total 5.96 1.21 259 
Note: Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement that, “The defendant is to 
blame for starting the fire.” Higher scores indicate greater agreement. Scale: 1 to 7. 
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Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with the 
statement, “The defendant intentionally caused injury to another person.” Responses ranged from 
1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). To examine whether harm and victim influenced 
agreement that the defendant intentionally caused injury to another person, a two-way analysis of 
variance was conducted with intentional injury as the dependent variable. The analysis yielded a 
Table I5    
Mean Ratings for Blame for Injury to Victim    
Harm Victim Instructions Mean SD N 
Mild Child Yes 5.44 1.42 36 
No 5.35 1.37 23 
Total 5.41 1.39 59 
Adult Yes 4.94 1.94 35 
No 5.19 1.96 27 
Total 5.05 1.94 62 
Total Yes 5.20 1.704 71 
 No 5.26 1.700 50 
 Total 5.22 1.70 121 
Severe Child Yes 5.22 1.42 36 
No 5.66 1.36 32 
Total 5.43 1.4 68 
Adult Yes 4.81 1.83 36 
No 5.26 2.05 34 
Total 5.03 1.94 70 
Total Yes 5.01 1.64 72 
 No 5.45 1.75 66 
 Total 5.22 1.7 138 
Total Child Yes 5.33 1.41 72 
No 5.53 1.36 55 
Total 5.42 1.39 127 
Adult Yes 4.87 1.87 71 
No 5.23 2 61 
Total 5.04 1.93 132 
Total Yes 5.10 1.669 143 
 No 5.37 1.722 116 
 Total 5.22 1.7 259 
Note: Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement that, “The defendant is to 
blame for injury to another person.” Higher scores indicate greater agreement. Scale: 1 to ). 
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significant main effect for victim, F (1, 255) = 6.522, p = .011 (see Table I6), such that when the 
victim was an adult, there were higher intentional injury ratings (M = 1.80, SD = 1.27) than 
when the victim was a child (M = 1.46, SD =.85). Harm did not significantly influence 
intentional injury ratings, F (1, 255) = 1.416, p = .235. 
 
Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with the 
statement, “The defendant is responsible for starting the fire.” Responses ranged from 1 
(Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). To examine whether harm and victim influenced 
agreement that the defendant was responsible for starting the fire, a two-way analysis of variance 
was conducted with responsibility for fire as the dependent variable. The analysis yielded no 
significant effect for harm, F (1, 255) = .237, p = .627, or victim, F (1, 255) = .089, p = .765 (see 
Table I7).  
 
Table I6      
Factorial ANOVA Results (DV = Intentionality Injury)  
Source Type III SS df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 9.589 3 3.196 2.710 .046 
Intercept 676.962 1 676.962 573.835 .000 
Harm 1.670 1 1.670 1.416 .235 
Victim* 7.694 1 7.694 6.522 .011 
Harm X Victim .528 1 .528 .447 .504 
Error 300.828 255 1.180   
Total 998.000 259   
Corrected Total 310.417 258    
Note. R2 = .031 (Adjusted R2 = .019).  *p < .05. 
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Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with the 
statement, “The defendant is responsible for causing injury to another person.” Responses ranged 
from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). To examine whether harm and victim 
influenced agreement that the defendant was responsible for injury to another person, a two-way 
analysis of variance was conducted with responsibility for injury as the dependent variable. The 
analysis yielded no significant effect for harm, F (1, 255) = .165, p = .685, or victim, F (1, 255) 
= 1.165, p = .281 (see Table I8). 
Table I7      
Factorial ANOVA Results (DV = Responsibility for Fire)  
Source Type III SS df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 2.881 3 .960 .643 .588 
Intercept 9622.030 1 9622.030 6442.111 .000 
Harm .353 1 .353 .237 .627 
Victim .133 1 .133 .089 .765 
Harm X Victim 2.342 1 2.342 1.568 .212 
Error 380.872 255 1.494  
Total 10059.000 259   
Corrected Total 383.753 258   
Note. R2 = .008 (Adjusted R2 = .004).   
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Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with the 
statement, “The defendant is to blame for starting the fire.” Responses ranged from 1 (Strongly 
Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). To examine whether harm and victim influenced agreement that 
the defendant was to blame for starting the fire, a two-way analysis of variance was conducted 
with blame for fire as the dependent variable. The analysis yielded no significant effect for harm, 
F (1, 255) = .000, p = .982, or victim, F (1, 255) = .139, p = .709 (see Table I9). 
 
 
Table I8      
Factorial ANOVA Results (DV = Responsibility for Injury)  
Source Type III SS df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 4.748 3 1.583 .522 .667 
Intercept 6985.631 1 6985.631 2305.005 .000 
Harm .499 1 .499 .165 .685 
Victim 3.531 1 3.531 1.165 .281 
Harm X Victim .516 1 .516 .170 .680 
Error 772.812 255 3.031  
Total 7783.000 259   
Corrected Total 777.560 258   
Note. R2 = .006 (Adjusted R2 = -.006).  
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Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with the 
statement, “The defendant is to blame for causing injury to another person.” Responses ranged 
from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). To examine whether harm and victim 
influenced agreement that the defendant was to blame for injury to another person, a two-way 
analysis of variance was conducted with blame for injury as the dependent variable. The analysis 
yielded no significant effect for harm, F (1, 255) = .000, p = 1.0, or victim, F (1, 255) = 3.212, p 
= .074 (see Table I10). 
 
 
Table I9      
Factorial ANOVA Results (DV = Blame for Fire)  
Source Type III SS df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model .959 3 .320 .216 .885 
Intercept 9159.436 1 9159.436 6201.045 .000 
Harm .001 1 .001 .000 .982 
Victim .205 1 .205 .139 .709 
Harm X Victim .697 1 .697 .472 .493 
Error 376.655 255 1.477  
Total 9582.000 259   
Corrected Total 377.614 258   
Note. R2 = .003 (Adjusted R2 = -.009).  
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Table I10      
Factorial ANOVA Results (DV = Blame for Injury)  
Source Type III SS df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 9.344 3 3.115 1.086 .356 
Intercept 7044.279 1 7044.279 2455.065 .000 
Harm 2.507E-7 1 2.507E-7 .000 1.000 
Victim 9.215 1 9.215 3.212 .074 
Harm X Victim .025 1 .025 .009 .925 
Error 731.667 255 2.869  
Total 7809.000 259   
Corrected Total 741.012 258   
Note. R2 = .013 (Adjusted R2 = .001).  
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